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ABSTRACT  
This paper analyzes the process of destabilization, crisis and adjustment in the Greek 
economy since the accession of the country to the European Union and, subsequently, 
the euro area. It reviews four policy cycles of the past 40 years, the four acts of the Greek 
tragedy, and discusses alternative ways forward, following the sudden stop and the 
great depression of the 2010s. It concludes that despite the significant constraints 
implied by continued participation in the euro area, namely a stark Mundellian conflict 
between internal and external balance, exiting the euro area risks further destabilizing 
the economy and bringing about a return of the problems of the 1980s. The current 
challenge for Greece is to seek to remain and prosper in the euro area. This would 
require a policy mix based on supply side reforms which would allow for a sustained 
recovery without the reemergence of external imbalances.  
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1. Introduction 
Greece has been making international financial and political headlines for almost ten years. 
Following the sudden stop in international lending in early 2010, triggered by the 
international financial crisis but largely due to Greece’s persistent macroeconomic 
imbalances, a real tragedy has unfolded. The Greek crisis rocked the euro area (EA) to its core. 
Greece had to be bailed out and adopt an externally imposed adjustment program, which in 
turn led to the deepest and longest depression of its post-war history. The crisis subsequently 
spread to other economies of the periphery of the euro area.  Between 2007 and 2016, Greek 
real GDP per capita fell by almost a quarter. The unemployment rate quadrupled. It peaked 
at 27.9% of the labor force in July 2013, from 7.3% in May 2008, and has only been falling 
extremely slowly since. Millions of Greeks had to face the specter of impoverishment and 
hundreds of thousands of educated and skilled Greeks migrated to other countries of the EU 
and the rest of the world, as real wages and pensions in Greece were cut substantially and 
adequately paying jobs have become hard to find. 
 
It is the main thesis of this paper that this tragedy has evolved in four acts since the accession 
of Greece to the European Union (EU) in 1981. The imbalances that emerged as a result of 
the macroeconomic policies of the 1980s, and the inadequacy of the adjustment efforts 
undertaken by successive Greek governments in the decades that followed, were the key 
factors that contributed to the final act of the tragedy. The final outcome also bears the stamp 
of the ‘troika’ of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the EC Commission and the European 
Central Bank (ECB), which designed the successive post-2010 economic adjustment programs. 
The inherent weaknesses of the euro area, and in particular the fact that it is far from an 
optimal currency area, also played a significant part in the Greek crisis. 
 
The Mundellian character of the critical two final acts of the Greek tragedy is based on the 
stark dilemma of a small open economy with low international competitiveness, such as 
Greece, in a regime of free capital mobility and irrevocably fixed exchange rates, such as the 
euro area. Such an economy, as first suggested by the analysis of Mundell (1963), faces a 
dilemma between internal and external balance, given that it has only one stabilization policy 
instrument, fiscal policy, with which to seek two conflicting goals. An expansionary fiscal 
policy moves it towards full employment at the expense of a widening current account deficit. 
A contractionary fiscal policy can correct the current account deficit, but at the expense of 
unemployment and recession. Devaluation, which could help resolve such a dilemma, is not 
an option. This Mundellian dilemma was not faced only by Greece, but by all the economies 
of the EA periphery, such as Spain, Portugal and Ireland. After all, the accumulation of current 
account deficits that led to the crisis was not confined to Greece. It characterized the rest of 
the euro area periphery as well, suggesting that some of the problems that plagued Greece 
were due to systemic weaknesses in the design of the euro area. However, it remains a fact 
that Greece had deeper and more serious macroeconomic imbalances than the rest of the 
euro area periphery. 
 
The question that arises, in view of the completion of the fourth act of the Greek tragedy in 
2018, is whether Greece can change course. Can the country adopt policies that will lead to a 
sustainable recovery of its economy, without returning to unsustainable current account 
deficits? Will this require an exit from the euro area or can it be achieved within its confines? 
The answers to these questions, based on a consistent and in-depth data-based analysis of 
the preceding four acts, constitute the main set of conclusions of this paper. 
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2. Greece and the Euro: A Synopsis 
Greece joined the European Union (EU), then called the European Economic Community 
(EEC), in 1981, following an application in June 1975, shortly after the restoration of 
democracy. The accession was initiated by the then Prime Minister, and later President of the 
Republic, Constantine Karamanlis, who saw it as a way of consolidating the newly restored 
democratic freedoms, as well as ensuring and furthering the social and economic progress of 
Greece.1 
For many years since 1950, Greece's macroeconomic performance had been among the most 
impressive in Europe and the rest of the world. High rates of economic growth had lifted a 
war-ravaged economy out of poverty, in an environment of low inflation, low unemployment, 
and absence of external crises. This lasted until the early 1970s, but was then driven to a 
gradual halt. During the 1980s, after Greece joined the EU, these trends were reversed as 
Greece experienced persistent stagflation. 
This reversal of fortunes, which coincided with EU entry and a change of government in 1981, 
largely occurred because the Greek authorities appeared determined to follow an 
idiosyncratic economic policy, completely at odds with the EU and the rest of the 
industrialized world. During the 1980s, a decade of fiscal and monetary discipline and 
cooperation for the rest of the EU, Greece engaged in an unprecedented fiscal and monetary 
expansion, which resulted in the rapid accumulation of a huge government debt, a sustained 
average annual inflation rate of about 20% and a significant deterioration in its international 
competitiveness. As a result, the unemployment rate more than doubled, while Greece also 
faced periodic balance of payments crises.2  
During the 1990s Greece attempted to change course and adapt to the requirements of the 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union. However, it did so half-heartedly, as the policy mix that 
it adopted was inadequate and lopsided. With the exception of the first part of the decade, it 
was primarily based on monetary rather than fiscal tightening, while structural reforms were 
few and in between. Greece managed to become part of the euro area (EA) in 2001, two years 
after the original eleven members, but, as a result of the inadequate and lopsided adjustment, 
the problems of low international competitiveness and fiscal weakness loomed large.3  
                                                     
1 As Karamanlis himself emphasized in his speech during the signing ceremony of the treaty on Greece’s 
accession to the EC in 1979, “Greece is entering Europe with the certainty that, within the framework of 
European solidarity, national independence is strengthened for all parties, democratic freedoms are 
safeguarded , economic growth is accelerated and, with the cooperation of all parties, social and economic 
progress will be the common fruit of our efforts.” Karamanlis (1979). The European Economic Community (EEC) 
was renamed the European Union (EU) in 1992, following the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. In the 
remainder of this paper we shall for the most part use the term European Union (EU), even when we refer to 
the pre-1992 EEC. 
2 For analyses of the Greek stagflation of the 1980s see Alogoskoufis and Christodoulakis (1991); Alogoskoufis 
and Philippopoulos (1992); Alogoskoufis (1995). Alogoskoufis (1993) and Papademos (1993) focused on how 
Greece could adapt so as to participate in the planned Economic and Monetary Union in the EU, from the 
perspective of the early 1990s. 
3
 See OECD (2001) for an assessment of the inadequate and lopsided adjustment that took place during the 
1990s. Bryant et al. (2001) also contain a number of interesting papers on the state and prospects of the Greek 
economy before participation in the euro area. Bosworth and Kollintzas (2001) focus on productivity and growth, 
Garganas and Tavlas (2001) focus on monetary policy and inflation, and Tsaveas (1991) focuses on 
competitiveness and the balance of payments. 
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From the moment that Greece became a member of the euro area it enjoyed a significant 
economic boom. This was mainly due to the rapid reduction in real interest rates following 
the elimination of the devaluation premium. In addition, the boom was reinforced by another 
round of fiscal expansion and wage increases in excess of productivity, which further boosted 
aggregate demand. As the boom also implied a significant deterioration in Greece’s current 
account and an unprecedented accumulation of external debt, Greece was caught in a 
Mundellian trap. Fiscal tightening in order to deal with external imbalances would kill the 
boom, while fiscal relaxation maintained the boom at the expense of large external 
imbalances. Having given up the option of using an expansionary monetary and exchange rate 
policy to simultaneously address both problems through a devaluation, Greece saw its 
external imbalances worsen much more than in the other economies of the euro area 
periphery. 
The international financial and economic crisis of 2008 provided the trigger for a re-evaluation 
of the sustainability of Greece’s external position. It eventually led to a ‘sudden stop’ in 
international lending in early 2010. Since then, Greece had to be bailed out by its euro area 
partners and adopt an externally imposed adjustment program, which led to possibly the 
deepest and longest peacetime depression in its history as an independent state. This has 
been the fourth act in the Greek tragedy of the last four decades, an act that has also shaken 
the very core of the euro area.4  
Some facts will help illustrate the main economic dimensions of this tragedy. In the 30 years 
before Greece entered the EU, the real per capita income of Greece rose fivefold, from €2.9 
thousand constant euros of 2010 in 1950, to €14.5 thousand in 1990. The annual growth rate 
of real per capita output was approximately 5.5%. In the subsequent 30 years, after Greece 
had become a member of the European Union, the real per capita income of Greece rose by 
only 1.4 times. From €14.5 thousand (constant euros of 2010) in 1980, to €20.3 thousand in 
2010. The annual growth rate of real per capita output fell to approximately 1.1%. This 
slowdown was much larger and abrupt than would have been expected on the basis of 
convergence to lower steady state growth. In the ten years since the international crisis of 
2008, the real per capita income of Greece has been falling. In 2016, at the deepest point in 
the recession, it had fallen to €17.1 thousand, almost 25% lower than its peak level of 2007, 
ten years earlier. Figure 1 depicts these trends. Similar trends can be detected in other related 
measures, such as per capita private consumption or average labor productivity.5 
 
 
 
                                                     
4 The international literature on the Greek economy has grown exponentially since the sovereign debt crisis of 
2010. Krugman (2010), Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2011), Alogoskoufis (2012), Ardagna and Caselli (2014), 
Galenianos (2015), Orphanides (2015), Ioannides and Pissarides (2015) and Gourinchas et al (2017) were among 
the first to analyze the origins and implications of the Greek crisis. Zettelmeyer et al (2013) concentrated on the 
debt restructuring of 2012. Reinhart and Trebesch (2015) focused on a historical comparison of the 2010 crisis 
with previous Greek defaults, since the 19th century. Meghir et al (2017) is an important recent collection, which 
contains papers analyzing a number of aspects of the Greek economy relevant to the crisis and the austerity 
program. Most chapters also contain interesting proposals for reform. See, among others, the introduction by 
the editors in Meghir et al (2017a) and Angeletos and Dellas (2017), Arkolakis et al (2017), Haliassos et al (2017), 
Lyberaki et al (2017), Skreta (2017) and Flevotomou et al (2017). 
5 The source of all data presented in this paper, unless indicated otherwise, is the Annual Macroeconomic Data 
Bank (AMECO) of the European Commission (November 2018). 
  
4 
Figure 1: GDP per Capita in Greece, 1948-2017 (thousand 2010 euros, log scale) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is clear that on purely economic grounds, participation in the EU and, subsequently the EA, 
did not fulfill the expectations of those who believed it would have an overall positive impact 
on the Greek economy. This was the case even before the crisis of 2010. In fact, Greece 
entered into a prolonged period of slow growth immediately after accession to the EU in 
1981, although EU accession can be seen as only one of the reasons for the slowdown in 
economic growth. It was only after the creation of the euro that Greece enjoyed a sustained 
rebound in economic growth. However, this was at the expense of a significant deterioration 
of the current account and the rapid accumulation of external debt. The international 
financial crisis and recession of 2008, and the policies that were adopted after the 2010 
sovereign debt crisis, led to Greece’s longest and deepest post war depression. 
What are the reasons behind these adverse macroeconomic developments following EU and 
EA accession? Are these adverse developments the inevitable outcome of integration into the 
EU and the EA, or the result of Greek post-accession economic policy choices? Could these 
developments be somehow avoided? Was entry into the euro area premature? Should there 
be a “Grexit”? Finally, what are the current prospects of the Greek economy within the euro 
area, in which it has been participating since 2001? 
As I argue in the rest of the paper, part of the problems that arose immediately after joining 
the EU were due to the inherent structural weaknesses of the post-war Greek economy and 
the implications of EU accession itself. Yet, this is not the most significant part. Many, if not 
most, of the problems arose because of the economic policies that Greece followed after EU 
accession in 1981, and in particular its macroeconomic and structural policies. 
With regard to accession to the euro area (EA) itself, in 2001, membership was almost 
certainly premature, as Greece entered the EA with relatively low international 
competitiveness and before the required fiscal and structural adjustment of the Greek 
economy was complete. As a result, after joining the EA, Greece had no way of addressing the 
central macroeconomic policy dilemma between, on the one hand, high growth and 
employment and, on the other hand, external balance. The economy was constrained by low 
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international competitiveness and fiscal imbalances and it had given up the tools of monetary 
and exchange rate policy. 
This Mundellian conflict between internal and external balance, characteristic of economies 
with low international competitiveness which operate under fixed exchange rates and free 
capital mobility, has been the main macroeconomic problem faced by Greece since it entered 
the euro area. The option of a one-off devaluation, which exists in regimes of fixed but 
adjustable exchange rates, does not exist in a single currency regime such as the EA. Hence, 
the only remaining instrument for stabilizing the economy is fiscal policy. 
However, under fixed exchange rates and free capital mobility, fiscal policy cannot solve the 
problem of the conflict between internal and external balance, even in the short run. 
According to the Mundell-Fleming model, the most widely accepted short-term analytical 
model of international macroeconomics, under free international capital mobility, a fiscal 
expansion results in an increase in aggregate domestic demand, causing an increase in GDP 
growth and a reduction of unemployment, but also results in a widening of the current 
account deficit. On the other hand, a fiscal contraction leads to a reduction in the current 
account deficit, but to the detriment of growth and employment, by reducing domestic 
demand and creating a recession.6 
This conflict between the objectives of internal and external balance is the main weakness of 
fiscal policy as a tool for stabilizing the economy in open economies that participate in a single 
currency regime with free capital mobility, such as the euro area.7 
In the case of Greece, the significant and sharp decline in real interest rates that accompanied 
EA membership, owing to the elimination of country risk and the risk of devaluation, led 
almost immediately to a significant increase in domestic investment and a reduction in 
national savings. As a result, growth accelerated, due to the increase in domestic demand, 
but there was also a significant widening of the current account deficit, due to the rise of 
investment relative to savings.8 
In addition, in the case of Greece, both fiscal and income policies were relaxed significantly 
after euro area accession in 2001. This relaxation provided more fuel to the economic boom 
                                                     
6 See Mundell (1963), Fleming (1962) for the origins of this view, which has since become the mainstream of 
short run open economy macroeconomics. The Mundell-Fleming model is the key short run macro model used 
in most major textbooks on international economics(Caves et al (2007), Feenstra and Taylor (2014), and 
Krugman et al (2017)), and also the basis of more sophisticated open economy “new-keynesian” dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models used by academic researchers, international organizations, 
national finance ministries and central banks. See Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe (2017) for a review of such open 
economy DSGE models.  
7 Of course, there are additional weaknesses of fiscal policy. As changes in fiscal policy require time consuming 
political agreements, parliamentary votes and partisan discussions, fiscal policy is characterized by much longer 
recognition, design and implementation lags than monetary policy. As a result, it is a rather inflexible and blunt 
instrument for stabilizing the economy. 
8 The rise in current account deficits as a result of the lower real interest rates that followed euro area entry was 
not confined to Greece. It occurred in the rest of the economies of the periphery of the euro area as well. See 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002). Almost all of these economies faced a serious external debt crisis after 2010. For 
analyses that focus on the wider dimensions of the euro area crisis see, among others, Lane (2012), O’Rourke 
and Taylor (2013), Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015, 2016), Orphanides (2015, 2017 a,b), Brunnenmeier et al (2016), 
Kang and Shambaugh (2016), Papademos (2016), Stiglitz (2016), Wyplosz (2016), Mody (2018) and Alogoskoufis 
and Jacque (2019). These wider systemic dimensions of the euro area crisis are briefly discussed in section 6 of 
the present paper.  
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and the current account deficit. Initiatives such as increases in wages and pensions, tax cuts, 
increases in military procurement, and the staging of the Olympic Games led to a further 
deterioration of the fiscal problem and exacerbated the problems of international 
competitiveness and the balance of payments. In any case, there is no doubt that fiscal and 
incomes policies following accession to the euro area placed too much emphasis on the 
objective of stimulating domestic demand, in order to boost growth and employment, and 
too little emphasis on improvements in international competitiveness and the correction of 
external imbalances. 
On the other hand, following the crisis of 2010 and the adoption of the externally imposed 
adjustment program, the emphasis of macroeconomic policy shifted almost exclusively 
towards tackling external imbalances, without any concern for domestic incomes, growth, 
and employment. As a result of this abrupt policy reversal, there was a disastrous recession 
for the Greek economy, where each percentage point of improvement in the current account 
in relation to GDP would cost about two and a half percentage points of GDP in terms of a 
decline in total domestic output, and around one and half percentage points of the labor 
force, in terms of a rise in unemployment. Thus, the cost in terms of lost output and jobs has 
been exorbitant. 
The main conclusion from this analysis is that, in order for Greece to recover after its major 
crisis and remain in the euro area, it should adopt a different mix of macroeconomic and 
structural policies, relative to the past four decades, including the eight year adjustment 
program of the 2010s. 
This new policy mix should be based on supply side reforms and concentrate on four main 
priorities: First, a revenue neutral tax reform that would encourage savings and investment. 
Second, a restoration of the ability of the financial system to use the increased savings in 
order to finance a recovering economy. Third, structural reforms that would create 
opportunities and incentives for foreign direct investment in sectors producing internationally 
tradable goods and services. Finally, a reform of the public sector through a shift in emphasis 
from public production and procurement of goods and services, to public regulation, even in 
socially sensitive sectors such as health, education and social security. This would help reduce 
public expenditure, increase economic efficiency, free up resources for social protection and 
private investment, and allow Greece to effectively reduce its gigantic public debt. In addition, 
a number of institutional and political reforms would be required in order to make this new 
policy mix sustainable and thus credible. 
The rest of the paper contains the full analysis that leads to these conclusions.   
 
3. The Restoration of Democracy and EU Accession 
Accession of Greece to the EU was achieved thanks to the vision, perseverance and efforts of 
the then Prime Minister, and later President of the Republic, Constantine Karamanlis. He was 
seeking the consolidation of the newly restored democratic freedoms but also the conditions 
that would guarantee the further social and economic progress of Greece. Accession was 
  
7 
completed after a relatively short preparation period, despite opposition from the left, and 
the reservations of a number of key European governments.9 
 
3.1 The Social and Political Climate of Post-1974 Greece 
In order to understand the evolution of Greek institutions and the macroeconomic policy 
choices of Greece in the last four decades, it is imperative to comprehend the prevailing Greek 
social, economic and political attitudes since the restoration of democracy in 1974.  
Post-1974 social and political attitudes and institutions have tended to favor the 
redistribution of income through taxation, a significant role for labor unions in wage setting, 
a dominant role for the state in sectors such as electricity, telecoms, water and sewage, 
banking, education and health, and policy discretion rather than strict policy rules. Public 
attitudes reflected a deeply rooted mistrust of market institutions, especially private 
corporations. These attitudes encouraged the emergence of powerful labor unions in the 
public sector, banking and agriculture and the capture of the state by the ruling political 
parties. As a result, and also because the Greek private sector mostly consists of self-
employed professionals and small family based enterprises (SMEs), the Greek social, political 
and economic system became significantly more ``corporatist'' in the post-1974 period, 
reflecting the political dominance of powerful public sector, small business and agricultural 
interests. 
This was in juxtaposition to the period between the end of the civil war and the coup of 1967, 
when Greece had a much more centralised and rules-based social, political and economic 
regime. This relatively authoritarian, yet democratic, political regime was put in place after 
the end of the civil war in 1949. It emphasized law and order, western style free enterprise, 
fiscal ‘orthodoxy’ but also a significant social and economic role for the state.10 
After 1967, the seven year-long dictatorship undermined both the ideological foundations 
and the political legitimacy of the post-war regime. The restoration of democracy could not 
but reflect new political and economic priorities. It led to the emergence of corporatist left-
of-center political attitudes, even more favorable to extensive state intervention, through a 
larger public sector, redistributive tax, social and labor policies and discretionary rather than 
rules-based macroeconomic policies. Such political attitudes permeated all political parties, 
                                                     
9 The issue of EU membership became the subject of intense political controversy after the restoration of 
democracy. The then rising opposition party, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), led by Andreas 
Papandreou, was firmly opposed to EU membership from the start. The Communist Party of Greece was also 
firmly opposed to membership, while the Euro-Communist Party of Greece (which later evolved into the current 
governing party, SYRIZA) was negative, but somewhat more ambivalent. Many key European leaders, such as 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany, were also initially opposed, although the French President, Vallery 
Giscard d’Estaing, was a key early supporter of Greece’s EU participation. 
10 As emphasized by Koliopoulos and Veremis (2002), p. 197, ‘The state had a considerably enhanced role in the 
post-war era. By assuming the entire burden of reconstruction and the allocation of massive foreign aid on the 
one hand, and the promotion of nationalist orthodoxy on the other, it increased its role in society. State planning, 
involving regulation of prices, the exchange rate and investment, and the extension of credit to the private 
sector, made the state the motor of the much-sought-after economic growth.’ 
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both left and right-of-center, although, in such an ideological environment, parties of the left 
obviously held a distinct political advantage.11 
The political party that dominated Greek politics in the thirty years between EU entry in 1981 
and the Greek crisis of 2010 was the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), a left-of-center 
party founded by Andreas Papandreou. It remained in power for over twenty years during 
this period, vis-a-vis only eight years for New Democracy (ND), the right-of-center party 
founded by Constantine Karamanlis. Thus, the policy choices of PASOK and the party’s 
dominance in the shaping of Greek institutions and the state bureaucracy following accession 
to the EU cannot be overemphasized.12 
In any case, the restoration of democracy marked the beginning of the end of the deep social 
divisions that were created during the occupation and the civil war of the late 1940s and its 
aftermath. It also marked the beginning of a process of emancipation of social groups 
associated with the left, as well as labor and agricultural unions, which had in large part 
remained at the margins of society and politics for at least a quarter of a century. It was also 
seen as the opportunity to satisfy social demands for a less centralized political system, 
redistribution of political power among the country’s regions and social groups, redistribution 
of income and wealth, and convergence to the democratic freedoms associated with the 
more developed economies of Western Europe. 
Following a referendum in 1974, the monarchy was abolished, and Greece became a Republic. 
In 1975 a new constitution was adopted, which, in the economic and social field, had very 
little relation to the previous democratic Constitution of 1952. The priorities of fiscal, income, 
credit and monetary policy, the role of trade unions, as well as the nature and the breadth of 
state economic activity changed radically, reflecting the new ideological and political 
attitudes. 
The demands of the middle and lower middle classes for a state that would actively play the 
role of protector and guarantor of their newly restored democratic freedoms and their living 
standards have since been one of the main drivers of Greek politics. These forces, through 
                                                     
11 Diamandouros (1986) has argued that the dictatorship never acquired political legitimacy or significant 
support. After the restoration of democracy ‘The entire party system had moved to the left, reflecting the 
political atmosphere of the time.’ (Kalyvas (2015), p. 120). It is characteristic that in the late 1970s, the head of 
the Confederation of Greek Industries ‘accused’ the then right-of-center government of Constantine Karamanlis 
of `socialmania', because of the nationalization of the second largest banking group, the ailing Olympic Airways 
and the largest shipyard. In addition, public sector unions came to be dominated by parties of the left and 
became much more militant. In the 45 years since 1974, left-of-center parties (PASOK, SYRIZA and others) 
dominated in government. They led governments for 26 years (58% of the time), and participated in coalition 
governments for another 5 years (11% of the time). The right-of-center party of ND formed governments for 14 
years (31% of the time), of which 6 were before EU accession, and only 8 after EU accession. Of the 39 years 
since accession to the EU, Greece has had left-of-center governments for 26 years (67% of the time), coalition 
governments with a minority participation of parties of the left for another 5 years (13% of the time) and right-
of-center governments for only 8 years (20% of the time). Even more significant is the fact that even right-of-
centre governments, being at a political disadvantage given the left-leaning attitudes of the electorate, often 
followed policies that mimicked the policies of the left. Appendix A lists Greek governments since the restoration 
of democracy in 1974, along with election dates and incoming Prime Ministers. 
12 As noted by Sotiropoulos (1993), p. 44-45, ‘In modern Greece, we have come to expect that as soon as a 
political party decisively wins the general elections it acquires full control over the state, and remains 
unchallenged in storming the bureaucracy with its own party personnel and in formulating and passing 
administrative legislation in parliament. The major theme ... is the imbalance of strength between political 
parties and the state in Greece, after the transition to democracy.’ 
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the emergence of the politically dominant PASOK, quickly led to the questioning and 
eventually the change of a very large part of the institutional structure that had characterized 
the economics and politics of the first twenty five years since the end of the civil war. Although 
the dominance of PASOK itself ended in the elections of 2012, many of the characteristics of 
the party were transferred to SYRIZA, the new dominant left-of-center party that emerged 
after the 2010 crisis. 
It is within this political and ideological context that one must understand the economic policy 
choices of Greece in the last four decades, the weakness of its institutions and the continuing 
resistance of the electorate to concepts such as rules based economic and social policies, 
fiscal consolidation, and market-based reforms.13 
 
3.2 The Greek Economy before EU Accession 
As already mentioned, after the Second World War and the civil war Greece had managed to 
create the conditions for a long period of sustained rapid economic growth. 
In the 30 years before Greece joined the EU (then EC), real per capita income rose fivefold. 
For many years since 1950, Greece's macroeconomic performance had been among the most 
impressive in Europe and the rest of the world. This lasted until the early 1970s. While Greece 
recovered relatively quickly from the first oil crisis of the 1970s, after the second oil crisis and 
accession to the EU, it entered a period of persistent stagflation from which it took many 
years to recover. 
In the initial post-war effort to rebuild its economy, Greece had the advantage of considerable 
financial assistance through the Marshall Plan, a US initiative that benefited almost all the 
economies of Western Europe. In addition, a key decision for Greece was to participate in all 
the post-war international economic institutions of the western world. 
Greece was a founding member of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation, which has grown into the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). In the early 1960s Greece even signed an association agreement with 
the newly established European Economic Community (EEC). 
However, due to its geographic location, tariff protection until the mid-1970s, and the seven 
year dictatorship of 1967-1974, the Greek economy of the late 1970s was relatively 
unprepared for full participation in the much more efficient and competitive European Union 
economy. 
                                                     
13 Evidence that the Greek electorate is still leaning to the left is provided by a recent survey conducted under 
the auspices of the Dianeosis institute, presented in Georgakopoulos (2017). Asked to place themselves in the 
political/ideological spectrum 41.4% of respondents place themselves right of centre (Liberalism (17.9%), 
Neoliberalism (9.6%), Conservatism (5.6%) and Nationalism (8.3%)). On the other hand, 46.1% associate 
themselves with values of the left (Social Democracy (19.7%), Ecology/Greens (8.1%), Socialism (12.7%) and 
Communism (5.6%)). Of the remaining 12.6%, 9.7% reply ‘none of the above’, and 2.9% ‘don’t know’. In addition, 
only 33.3% believe that the word ‘capitalism’ represents something positive, while the corresponding 
percentage for the word ‘socialism’ is 62.1%.  
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The growth miracle of the 1950s and 1960s had taken place under protective tariffs and 
restrictions on capital movements, which constituted a shield for the then “infant” Greek 
industry, and particularly manufacturing. Industrial production expanded in the early postwar 
decades in order to serve the domestic market through import substitution, but Greek 
manufacturing never really managed to penetrate the more competitive markets of the 
economies of western Europe. This was despite the fact that government interference in labor 
relations, and the suppression of the Communist Party of Greece since the end of the civil 
war, resulted in a rather weak trade union movement.  
In addition, due to geopolitical constraints, Greek industry never had a chance to penetrate 
the markets of neighboring economies such as Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania and 
Turkey. This was a major disadvantage, as the gravity model suggests that trade is much easier 
with neighboring economies. Moreover, during the period of the dictatorship, Greece had 
been politically isolated from the rest of Europe, which also resulted in its relative economic 
isolation. 
The only two sectors that became internationally competitive were shipping and the tourism 
industry, reflecting deep rooted comparative advantages of Greece, due to its geography, 
history and climate. Earnings from these two sectors contributed significantly to the balance 
of payments throughout the post-war period. Two other factors that contributed positively 
to the current account were emigrant remittances until the 1970s and EU transfers, since 
1981. 
In any case, the international competitiveness of Greek manufacturing remained low even 
during the period of high growth. Moreover, the oil shocks of the 1970s further weakened 
the position of Greek industry. A similar result followed from the abolition of protective 
tariffs, which was a condition for Greece's participation in the EU, as well as the increased 
militancy of trade unions following the restoration of democracy.14 
As a result, the Greek economy which joined the EU in 1981 was an economy with problems 
of international competitiveness, which had been further exacerbated by the oil crises, the 
reduction of tariff protection and increased trade union militancy. On the other hand, by the 
end of the 1970s, the fiscal situation was not particularly worrying as public debt was at a very 
low level compared to GDP. 
 
3.3 Economic Policy in the Run Up to EU Accession 
The economic policy of the 1975-1979 period was shaped by three main forces. The social 
pressure for redistribution of income and wealth, the prevalence of social and political 
perceptions that contributed to the expansion of state economic activity and the adjustments 
and preparations for Greece’s entry into the EU. 
These forces influenced almost all economic policy choices in the period up to accession in 
1981 and beyond. 
                                                     
14 See Giannitsis (1993) for a discussion of how Greek industry was affected by world market integration through 
Greece’s entry into the EU. 
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As a result of the policy of that period, there was a rapid recovery of the Greek economy from 
the recession of 1974, unemployment remained at very low levels, there was a modest fall in 
inflation from its high of 25% in 1974, and significant surpluses in the current account. Until 
1980, the budget deficit remained low, below 3% of GDP, while there was a significant 
improvement in wages and pensions in real terms. 
However, the second oil crisis that erupted in 1979 led to a new episode of stagflation. Growth 
rates declined sharply, from 7.2% in 1978, to 3.3% in 1979, to 0.7% in 1980. In 1981 there was 
another recession following that of 1974. Inflation almost doubled, from 13.2% in 1978 to 
22.5% in 1980 and 23.2% in 1981. Unemployment also doubled from 1.9% of the labor force 
in 1978 to 4% in 1981. Finally, the deficit of the general government, in the electoral year 
1981, more than tripled to 9% of GDP, from just 2.6% in 1980. 
Thus, 1981, the year of EU accession, was also a year of significant destabilization of the Greek 
economy, due to the second international oil crisis and the domestic electoral cycle.  
As suggested by the OECD, in its periodic review of the Greek economy following EU entry, 
Greece ought to have prioritized the improvement in its international competitiveness. 
“If the growth of the economy is to be sustained over the medium term it will need to be 
based on a substantial and continuing rise in the volume of exports of goods and services and 
the development of genuinely competitive import-substitution industries. An improvement 
in competitiveness is an essential condition in this respect.” (OECD (1982) p. 56).  
Towards the end of the year, in the elections of October 1981, the Panhellenic Socialist 
Movement (PASOK) of Andreas Papandreou was swept into power promising ‘change’. A 
party that was initially opposed to EU membership, was called upon by the voters to manage 
the fortunes of Greece immediately after EU accession.15 
 
4. The Greek Economy since EU Accession 
There is little doubt that the Greek economy was relatively unprepared for participation in 
the much more efficient and competitive EU economy in the early 1980s.  
The economic miracle of the 1950s and the 1960s, when annual GDP growth rates exceeded 
7% on average, had taken place under protective tariffs. Although tariffs had been on a 
downward trend, due to the GATT rounds of trade liberalization, they had provided a relative 
shelter for the emerging Greek industry. The maintenance of low inflation, at an average 
annual rate of 2.5%, from the mid-1950s to 1972, during the period when Greece participated 
in the Bretton Woods System of fixed exchange rates, also contributed to a stable economic 
and financial climate. This helped boost confidence, savings, investment and growth. 
From the 1950s to the 1970s, manufacturing had expanded in order to service the domestic 
market, but never became successful in international markets. The international 
competitiveness of Greek industry remained low throughout this period. Furthermore, the oil 
shocks of the 1970s weakened the competitive position of the energy intensive Greek 
                                                     
15 Appendix A reviews political developments in Greece, listing elections, governing parties and incoming prime 
ministers from 1974 till 2019. 
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industry, and the subsequent removal of protective tariffs, a precondition for EEC 
participation, weakened it even further. 
Yet, in addition to external developments, the deterioration of the performance of the Greek 
economy since EU accession was mainly due to domestic reasons such as the change in the 
priorities of macroeconomic and structural policy following EU entry. 
We highlight four separate domestic policy cycles in Greece since accession to the EU. They 
roughly correspond to the 1980s, the 1990s, the 2000s and the 2010s.  
The key macroeconomic developments with regard to growth, inflation, unemployment and 
the current account are presented in figures 2 to 5. 
4.1 The 1980s: Stagflation and Destabilization 
In sharp contrast to the recommendations of international organizations, such as the OECD, 
the first policy cycle, that of the 1980s, in the immediate aftermath of the second oil shock 
and EU accession, dealt an additional and very significant negative blow to the 
competitiveness of Greek industry. In addition, it eventually saddled the Greek economy with 
high government debt and a much larger public sector than before. These problems have 
constituted a significant burden ever since.  
The administration of Andreas Papandreou, which was swept into power in 1981 did not 
reverse EU accession itself, but attempted a so-called ‘third way to socialism’, within the 
European Union. Its initiatives resulted in exorbitant labor cost increases in the early 1980s, 
an expansion of the public sector, higher taxation, high inflation and the explosion of 
government debt. These constituted severe, domestically induced, adverse shocks to the 
Greek economy. They contributed to economic stagnation and the rise in both inflation and 
unemployment, a key characteristic of the 1980s. 
Figure 2: Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP in Greece: 1950-2017 
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The average annual GDP growth rate in the 1980s fell to a miserly 0.8%, whereas the average 
annual inflation rate jumped to 19.5%, from 12.3% in the 1970s, and only 4.3% in the 1950s 
and the 1960s. The unemployment rate rose from 1.9% in 1979 to 7.2% in 1984, and remained 
at this higher level throughout the decade. The current account moved from a surplus of 2% 
of GDP in 1980 to a deficit of 3.1% of GDP in 1985, prompting the adoption of a short lived 
stabilization program. Meanwhile, the general government debt to GDP ratio kept growing 
rapidly throughout the 1980s, from 22.7% in 1980 to 72.5% in 1990. 
The emergency stabilization program of the mid-1980s was too little too late, as it was both 
one sided and temporary. It was one sided, in that it only concentrated on containing unit 
labor costs, in order to reverse the rise in the current account deficit, and temporary, as it 
was abandoned after only two years. A prolonged electoral cycle again destabilized the Greek 
economy in the late 1980s. 
The OECD, in its periodic report on the Greek economy at the end of the 1980s, highlighted 
both the fiscal destabilization and the reduction in international competitiveness that 
occurred. 
“Since the beginning of the 1980s there has been an unprecedented trend deterioration in 
the financial position of the public sector, witnessed by a rapid increase in borrowing 
requirements and debt.” (OECD (1990), p. 39). 
“Excessively-rising real wages in relation to low productivity growth, and the lack of 
motivation of workers, notably in the public sector, signal problems in the functioning of the 
Greek labour market. There are important aspects of the wage formation process that explain 
why real wage gains do not adequately reflect exogenous productivity developments either 
at the aggregate level or between different skills. Institutional features and labour legislation 
have combined to weaken the responsiveness of employment to labour demand changes.” 
(OECD (1990), p. 62)  
Figure 3: Annual Consumer Price Inflation: 1950-2017 
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4.2 The 1990s: The Lopsided Adjustment 
It was only in the early 1990s that Greece started to seriously tackle the much wider policy-
induced imbalances that had weakened its economy during the 1980s.  
Attempts were made to contain inflation and the rise in the public sector and government 
debt, to introduce privatizations and market friendly structural reforms, and also to align 
Greece with the economic priorities of the EU, such as the single market, the European 
Monetary System (EMS), and the planned monetary union (EMU).16 
As can be seen from Figures 2-5, the annual GDP growth rate picked up to an average of 3.3% 
in the second part of the 1990s, and the annual inflation rate fell to an average of 6%. 
Unemployment continued rising modestly. The weak recovery was accompanied by an 
increase in the current account deficit to 5.1% of GDP in the second part of the decade from 
only 0.9% in the first part of the decade.  
The reform and convergence programs of the 1990s, the second economic policy cycle in our 
narrative, were lopsided, unbalanced, not appropriately targeted, and clearly not sufficiently 
ambitious. The government debt to GDP ratio rose in the early 1990s, as unrecorded debts 
from the 1980s were incorporated into the official debt figures, but was then stabilized. 
However, the pace of introduction of fiscal adjustment and growth oriented structural 
reforms was quite slow and uneven. In addition, the reform and convergence programs were 
saddled with frequent policy reversals around the time of elections.17 
Figure 4: The Unemployment Rate: 1956-2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The adjustment relied mostly on monetary tightening, which resulted in a gradual reduction 
of inflation and inflationary expectations. Yet, this was not accompanied by a sufficient fiscal 
adjustment. Hence the adjustment was lopsided. The adjustment of the primary deficit of the 
                                                     
16 Alogoskoufis (1993) and Papademos (1993) analyze the policy options for Greece from the perspective of the 
early 1990s, in view of the plans for EMU. 
17 Fiscal developments are analyzed in detail in section 4. 
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general government mostly took place in the first half of the 1990s, and was subsequently 
partly reversed. Adjustment of the headline deficit of the general government continued into 
the second part of the 1990s but this was mainly due to the falling inflationary expectations, 
which brought about rapid declines in interest rates and, hence, interest payments on 
government debt. 
 Despite the lopsided nature of the adjustment, Greece had partially changed course from the 
policies of the 1980s. It eventually scraped through in order to participate in the euro area 
with only a two-year delay relative to the initial 11 members.  
The Greek economy remained an economy with low international competitiveness and 
significant fiscal imbalances, but it had managed to tame inflation, as can be seen from figure 
3. As can be seen from figure 8, it also managed to put a lid on the growth of the general 
government to debt to GDP ratio, an important burden since the 1980s. 
At the end of the 1990, and after Greece had secured participation in the euro area, the OECD, 
in an otherwise optimistic report, does once again raise a number of concerns. 
“While the growth and inflation performance has improved considerably, major policy 
challenges lie ahead. Furthermore, following this extraordinary effort, monetary policy had 
to ease in 2000 prior to joining EMU, thus fuelling demand. With rapid growth projected to 
continue in 2001 and 2002, underlying inflationary pressures could rise. Fiscal policy should 
thus tighten and tax cuts only be implemented if accompanied by spending cuts. There has 
been expenditure slippage in recent years, largely due to the failure to implement wide-
ranging health, pension and administrative reforms. In all three areas deep reforms are 
needed not only to improve the efficiency of the public sector but also to keep a sufficient 
primary surplus to ensure a rapid reduction in debt. Structural reform has also been slow in 
many other areas.” (OECD (2001), p. 17-18). 
 
4.3 The 2000s: Euro area Participation, Macroeconomic Euphoria and External 
Debt 
Greece’s macroeconomic policy changed course again after the country had secured its full 
participation in the euro area. This is the third policy cycle in our narrative. It was marked by 
the macroeconomic euphoria created by accession to the euro area and the reduction of 
nominal and real interest rates. In addition, immediately after accession, and despite the 
warnings of international organizations such as the IMF and the OECD, fiscal deficits started 
increasing again. The electoral cycle returned with a vengeance, while the government 
encouraged wage and pension increases and initiated tax cuts and expensive public sector 
expenditure programs, such as large-scale increases in military procurement and the Olympic 
Games of 2004. 
Euro area participation resulted in a significant fall in not only nominal, but real interest rates 
as well. As Greece was now operating in a low interest rate environment, households, firms 
and the government could now borrow at very low rates, which induced them to raise 
investment and reduce savings. This resulted in an increase in aggregate demand, growth and 
employment, but also a rapid deterioration of the current account. The significant surplus of 
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Figure 5: The Current Account: 1960-2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
private savings over investment, which in the past had helped keep the current account deficit 
small, even in the presence of deficits of the general government, was gradually transformed 
into a significant deficit. This is documented in figure 6 on the current account deficit and the 
private savings-investment imbalance. The evolution of aggregate investment itself is 
depicted in Figure 7.18 
The higher investment and consumption since 1998 also boosted aggregate demand and 
resulted in relatively high economic growth rates and a fall in unemployment. As can be seen 
from figures 1 and 2, GDP growth rose to an average of 4.0% per annum between 1998 and 
2007. Like most other economies, Greece was affected by the deep international recession of 
2008-2009, and growth rates became negative during those two years. Unemployment was 
on a falling trend, from 12% of the labor force in 1999 to 7.8% in 2008. Inflation also remained 
low at around 3.0%, although slightly higher than the EA average. 
However, the higher investment and consumption also resulted in an explosion of current 
account deficits, as shown in figures 5 and 6. Greece’s already high public debt, previously 
mainly domestic, was quickly transformed into external debt. The Greek state could now 
borrow at low interest rates from abroad while Greek banks used their substantial stocks of 
government bonds as collateral to borrow from banks in the rest of the EU. These 
collateralized loans from abroad allowed Greek banks to meet the increased, and more 
lucrative, demand for credit by domestic households and firms. Domestic credit expanded 
extremely rapidly fuelling the boom and the current account deficits. 
                                                     
18 The private savings investment balance in figure 6 is equal to the difference between the current account 
balance and the balance of the general government. It measures the contribution of the private sector to the 
current account. Gross Fixed Capital Formation in figure 7 is at 2010 prices as a percentage of GDP at 2010 prices. 
Source: European Commission, Annual Macroeconomic Data Bank, November 2018, and OECD, Annual 
Statistics, 2018. 
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Figure 6: Private Savings Investment Balance and the Current Account (% of GDP, 1970-2017) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total credit through the financial system rose from 81.5% of GDP in 1999 to 131.3% in 2009. 
Total credit to the private sector rose from 34.2% of GDP in 1999 to 105.1% in 2009. Total 
domestic credit to the general government, including stocks of government bonds, fell from 
47.2% of GDP in 1999 to only 26.2% in 2009. It is obvious from the above that Greek banks 
were using previously held government bonds as collateral in order to borrow from European 
and other international banks, in order to finance the increased borrowing of the domestic 
private sector. 
Figure 7: Gross Fixed Capital Formation, % of GDP: 1950-2017 
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Thus, the explosion of credit facilitated, sustained and financed both the increased current 
account deficit and the internationalization of Greek government debt. The current account 
deficit displays a marked upward trend since 1995. From 0.9% of GDP during 1990-95, the 
average current account deficit rises to 5.1% of GDP during 1995-99, 9.3% of GDP during 2000-
2004 and 13.1% of GDP during 2005-09. Government debt, two thirds of which was previously 
held by domestic banks, was rapidly transformed into foreign debt.  
As in a number of other countries of the EA periphery, the dangers from the evolution of the 
current account deficit were largely ignored for many years, because of the false sense of 
security resulting from participation in the euro area, the recovery in the rate of economic 
growth and the fall in unemployment without a rise in inflation. A stabilization program after 
the Olympic games, during 2005-2006, eventually proved too little too late, as it was 
discontinued due to the political instability that resulted after the elections of 2007, which 
returned the government with a marginal parliamentary majority, and the international 
economic and financial crisis of 2008-09. 
 
4.4 The 2010s: The “Sudden Stop” and the Great Depression 
The international financial crisis of 2008-09 provided the spark to international investors for 
the reassessment of Greece’s ability to service the external debt that had been accumulating 
during the previous ten years.19 
The international financial crisis initially resulted in a modest widening of Greek bond spreads. 
The situation reached crisis proportions because of the widening of the fiscal deficit during 
2009, a revision of the fiscal accounts in late 2009, and domestic political disputes during the 
electoral 2009, which further destabilized the economy. These allowed for Greece to be 
portrayed as a perpetrator and not a victim of the international financial crisis. Spreads on 
Greek 10 year bonds over German bonds widened significantly in the first few months of 
2010. In these conditions, and given that the European Central Bank was unable to act as 
lender of last resort to EU governments in the initial phases of the euro area crisis, Greece 
experienced a “sudden stop” to international lending. In April 2010, it had to seek official 
assistance from its EU partners. 
The adjustment program that was adopted after the eruption of the 2010 crisis defines the 
fourth macroeconomic policy cycle in our narrative. It was a hastily designed program of steep 
fiscal consolidation, reductions in nominal wages and a catalog of structural reforms, many of 
which recommended in the past by international organizations such as the IMF, the OECD, 
the European Commission and the European Central Bank. Its implementation resulted in the 
longest and deepest recession in Greece’s postwar history. 
As can be deduced from figures 2-6, Greek GDP fell by an annual average of almost 5% in the 
five years between 2010 and 2014. The average unemployment rate more that doubled, to 
almost 22%, from 9% in 2005-2009. Average inflation and the current account deficit were 
halved, to 1.5% and 6% of GDP respectively. Because of the unexpectedly deep and long 
recession, the total balance of the general government remained slightly higher than in the 
                                                     
19 Appendix B contains a brief chronology of the Greek crisis. 
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previous five years, at 9.4% of GDP, while average government debt, despite a significant 
haircut in 2012, shop up to 167% of GDP, from 110% of GDP in the previous five years.  
The reduction in the current account deficit was achieved at an exorbitant economic and 
social cost. 
Whereas previous economic policy cycles can be directly attributed to internal Greek politics 
and the choices of the Greek political system, this fourth cycle, and its spectacular failures, 
cannot be considered as a purely Greek responsibility. The ‘troika’ of the EU Commission, the 
ECB and the International Monetary Fund were directly involved in both the design of the 
program and its implementation. Failures of the program are as much their own 
responsibility, as they are the responsibility of post-2010 Greek governments, who never truly 
embraced the program given the opposition of the Greek electorate. 
We next turn to a more detailed examination of each of the four policy cycles. We shall 
concentrate on fiscal, monetary, financial and competitiveness developments during each of 
the four policy cycles, as well as on the weaknesses of the euro area itself. In the end, we shall 
bring our conclusions together to discuss the prospects and policy options of the Greek 
economy. 
Figure 8: General Government Gross Debt, % of GDP: 1970-2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Cycles of Fiscal Relaxation and Incomplete Adjustment 
At the time of EU accession in 1981, the budget deficit rose as a result of both the 
international recession induced by the second oil shock and the domestic electoral cycle. This 
proved to be the beginning of a painful cycle of fiscal destabilization which has been haunting 
the Greek economy ever since. 
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Fiscal deficits remained high throughout the 1980s. The government of Andreas Papandreou, 
which remained in power during the 1980s, followed policies that caused a further expansion 
of the public sector and used the budget to redistribute income towards public sector 
employees and pensioners and increase all kinds of social expenditures and transfers. These 
sustained deficits resulted in an explosion of government debt throughout the decade, as 
shown in Figure 8.20  
 
5.1 The Destabilization of Public Finances in the 1980s 
Figure 9 depicts the evolution of the budget balance of the general government for the period 
1970-2017. Until Greece’s accession to the EU deficits of the general government seemed to 
have been under control. However, after accession they reached unprecedented levels for a 
peacetime period.21 
Figure 9: General and Primary Government Balance, % of GDP: 1970-2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen from Figure 9, the deficits in the 1980s rose throughout the decade, but mainly 
during the election years 1981, 1985 and 1989-90. This electoral rise in the fiscal deficit is a 
pattern that continued in the subsequent policy cycles and continues until the present day.22 
                                                     
20 Figure 8 depicts Gross Debt of the General Government as a percentage of GDP. Source: European 
Commission, Annual Macroeconomic Data Bank, November 2018. 
21 Figure 9 depicts Total and Primary Balance of the General Government as a per- centage of GDP. A positive 
number indicates a surplus. The Primary Balance is Total Revenue minus Primary Expenditure, which excludes 
interest payments on government debt, and the Total Balance is Total Revenue minus Total Expenditure, which 
includes interest payments. Darker bars indicate election years. Source: European Commission, Annual 
Macroeconomic Data Bank, November 2018. 
22 See Alogoskoufis (1995, 2013) and Lockwood et al (2001) for economic and econometric investigations of this 
electoral cycle in budget deficits in Greece. 
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The sustained rise in the deficit of the general government during the 1980s led to the 
complete destabilization of public finances. This was originally due to the surge in current 
primary spending. However, as it subsequently led to a gradual increase in government debt, 
it eventually brought about a surge in interest payments too. As a result, total expenditure of 
the general government rose from 26.1% of GDP in 1980 to 40.9% of GDP in 1989. This was 
an unprecedented rise of 14.8 percentage points of GDP. The revenues of the general 
government could not of course follow this trend. Despite a large increase in the tax burden, 
total government revenues rose by just 5.2 percentage points of GDP, from 23.5% of GDP in 
1980 to 28.7% in 1989. Thus, the main reason for the high budget deficits in the period 1980-
1989 was the rise in total government expenditure by 3 times as much as the rise in 
government revenue. The trends in government expenditure and revenue as a percentage of 
GDP are depicted in Figure 10.23 
Figure 10: Expenditure and Revenue of the General Government, % of GDP: 1970-2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The persistent rise of the general government deficit throughout the 1980s resulted in an 
explosion of the debt of the general government. As can be seen from Figure 8, the debt of 
the general government shot up, from 22.7% of GDP in 1980 to 72.5% in 1990. In addition, 
because not all deficits and debts were properly recorded at the time, additional debts that 
had arisen in the 1980s had to be added to official government debt in the early 1990s. 
It is also worth noting, that the shortfall of government revenue relative to expenditure 
contributed to the loosening of monetary policy. The government was financing a significant 
part of the annual deficit through borrowing from the Bank of Greece, which contributed to 
                                                     
23 Figure 10 depicts Expenditure and Revenue of the General Government as a percentage of GDP. It also depicts 
Primary Expenditure, which excludes interest payments on government debt. Total Expenditure is the sum of 
Primary Expenditure and interest payments. Source: European Commission, Annual Macroeconomic Data Bank, 
November 2018. 
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monetary growth, the depreciation of the exchange rate and inflation. This thread is taken up 
in section 5 on monetary policy.24 
 
5.2 Weak Fiscal Adjustment and Euro area Entry 
Fiscal and more general macroeconomic conditions in 1989 and 1990 were particularly 
critical. Recorded fiscal deficits were out of control, unrecorded deficits and debts had 
accumulated throughout the public sector, the social security system was on the brink of 
collapse, foreign exchange reserves had fallen dramatically and inflation was following an 
accelerating upward trend.  
The outgoing government of Andreas Papandreou proceeded in a pre-election change of the 
electoral system towards proportional representation, so as to limit the parliamentary 
consequences of its electoral defeat. This led to three consecutive inconclusive elections and 
interim governments, despite large electoral majorities by ND. It was only in April 1990 that 
a stable new government could be formed, with Constantine Mitsotakis as Prime Minister. 
However, because of the electoral system, this new government had the smallest possible 
parliamentary majority (one deputy), despite the significant margin of its electoral win. 
The election of the Mitsotakis government in 1990 marked the beginning of a systematic 
effort to tackle the imbalances and distortions of the Greek economy that had developed 
during the 1980s. 
Part of this effort was a program to tackle fiscal deficits, which had risen even further during 
the prolonged electoral period. In addition, at the end of 1991, Greece co-signed the 
Maastricht Treaty, which provided for the transformation of the EEC into the European Union 
and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with the creation of a single currency.  
Fiscal deficits were reduced significantly between 1990 and 1992, and the large primary 
deficit was transformed into a small primary surplus. However, because of the fiscal 
adjustment and other structural reforms, the Mitsotakis government soon became 
unpopular. Early election were forced in October 1993, and Andreas Papandreou was 
returned with a large parliamentary majority. Following that election, PASOK remained in 
government continuously for more than ten years, until the spring of 2004.25 
The move towards the single currency required the submission by all countries of 
convergence programs that would meet particular budgetary and monetary criteria. Among 
the fiscal criteria, two stood out. Deficits of the general government were required to fall 
below 3% of GDP for all countries wishing to participate in EMU, while the general 
government debt was required to fall below 60% of GDP, or display a downwards trend 
towards this target. 
                                                     
24 See Alogoskoufis and Christodoulakis (1991) for an analysis of this link between fiscal deficits, the demand for 
seigniorage by the government and inflation in the case of Greece. 
25 One of the reasons for the comfortable parliamentary majorities of PASOK during this decade was the fact 
that the Mitsotakis government had again changed the electoral system back to a system that favored the party 
which won an electoral majority in national elections. This change backfired for the Mitsotakis government, as 
it soon lost its electoral support due to the unpopularity of its reform agenda. 
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Greece was initially a long way from these fiscal targets. The general government deficit at 
the end of 1991 stood at 9.9% of GDP, more than three times the Maastricht target, while 
government debt stood at 75% of GDP, compared to the 60% required by the treaty. Like all 
other EU countries Greece was required to submit a Convergence Program, detailing how it 
intended to achieve the required criteria.  
The first Convergence Program of the Greek Economy was drafted by the Mitsotakis 
government, and was approved by the EU in March 1993. It envisaged a gradual adjustment 
of fiscal deficits, inflation and nominal interest rates, so that Greece could achieve a timely 
accession to EMU. The program was revised in September 1994 by the new government of 
Andreas Papandreou, that emerged from the October 1993 elections. Although the revised 
program did not contain major changes of direction, it envisaged a more gradual fiscal and 
structural adjustment and lower rates of economic growth. It was on the basis of this revised 
program that Greece achieved accession to the Euro area in January 2001, having missed the 
first deadline for participation in 1999. 
Fiscal adjustment in the 1990s resulted in a fall of the deficit of the general government from 
14.3% of GDP in 1990 to 5.8% of GDP in 1999. This decrease was due to both a significant 
reduction in the primary deficit of the general government, chiefly in the first part of the 
1990s, and a fall of interest payments on general government debt, as nominal interest rates 
fell towards the end of the 1990s, following the reduction in inflation.  
In 1990, the primary deficit, i.e., the deficit excluding interest payments, stood at 5.1% of GDP. 
This deficit declined rapidly in the 1990-94 period, the first part of the decade. By 1994 it had 
already been transformed into a primary surplus of 4.2% of GDP, marking an improvement of 
more than 9 percentage points of GDP. More than three fifths of this improvement in the first 
part of the decade was due to the increase in general government revenues, from 30.9% of 
GDP in 1990 to 36.7% in 1994. The remainder, slightly less that two fifths, was due to a 
reduction in primary expenditure of the general government, from 36.0% of GDP in 1990 to 
32.5% in 1994. 
The further adjustment of the primary balance was not pursued after 1994. As a result, the 
primary balance gradually deteriorated again. In 1999, the primary surplus had declined to 
only 1.8% of GDP, as primary expenditure had crept back up to 38.6% percent of GDP, higher 
than at the start of the decade. Thus, for the decade as a whole, the adjustment of the primary 
deficit was only equal to 6.8 percentage points of GDP, all of it due to increases in government 
revenue, which rose by almost ten percentage points of GDP. 
How did Greece then manage to satisfy the fiscal criteria that were set out in the Maastricht 
Treaty? To the extent that it did satisfy these criteria, this was due to the additional 
contribution made by the reduction of nominal interest rates in the second part of the 
decade. This was a result of the fall of inflation and inflationary expectations and the fall of 
the inflation and devaluation premium on interest rates, as euro area entry was approaching. 
As we shall demonstrate below, when we discuss monetary and exchange rate policy, 
inflationary expectations and expectations of a devaluation had kept nominal interest rates 
on Greek government debt high since the beginnings of the financial liberalization of the late 
1980s. These expectations were reversed towards the end of the 1990s. As a result, interest 
payments on Greek government debt fell from 9.2% of GDP in 1990, to 7.6% in 1999, having 
risen to a high of 12.5% of GDP in 1994, in the aftermath of the crisis in the European 
Monetary System. This reduction of nominal interest rates contributed significantly to the 
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reduction of the deficit of the general government in the second half of the 1990s, and 
allowed for Greece’s entry into the euro area in the year 2000. 
It is important to emphasise that the reduction of the deficit of the general government in the 
second part of the 1990s was not due to the further adjustment of the primary balance of the 
general government, but to a reduction in nominal interest rates, due to lower inflation and 
devaluation expectations because of monetary tightening. 
It is also important to note that despite the fall of the government deficit and the creation of 
small primary surpluses, the general government debt to GDP ratio rose during the 1990s. It 
was equal to 72.5% of GDP in 1990, and ended up to 98.9% of GDP in 1999. This was partly 
due to the gradual incorporation into government debt of the “hidden”, or “unrecorded” 
debts and deficits of the 1980s, during 1990-1993, but is also an additional indication of how 
weak was the fiscal adjustment of the 1990s.  
This increase in the government debt to GDP ratio did not preclude Greece’s entry into the 
euro area, as it was deemed that the stabilization of the government debt to GDP ratio in the 
few years before euro area entry constituted sufficient progress on the debt criterion.   
In conclusion, Greece entered the euro area following a decade of very weak and lopsided 
fiscal adjustment. The small fiscal adjustment that was achieved was mainly based on 
increases in government revenue and the reduction of interest payments on government 
debt, which came about as a result of the reduction of inflation and devaluation expectations. 
This caused a reduction in nominal interest rates. The inexorable rise in primary government 
expenditure continued, albeit at a slower pace, while government debt was also actually 
higher relative to GDP at the end of the 1990s. Thus, upon entering the euro area Greece 
continued to be characterized by significant fiscal imbalances. 
 
5.3 Euro area Entry and“Euro Euphoria” 
As if the inadequate fiscal adjustment of the 1990s was not enough of a problem, fiscal policy 
was relaxed immediately following euro area entry.  
The small primary surpluses that had been created in the 1990s began to gradually become 
even smaller. By 2002 Greece again had a primary deficit of 0.5% of GDP. By the election year 
of 2004, the primary deficit had widened to 4.0% of GDP. This was the result of both a further 
expansion of primary expenditure of the general government and a reduction in government 
revenue, due to tax cuts undertaken by the second Simitis government, in power between 
2000 and 2004.26  
Primary government expenditure rose from 38.6% of GDP in 1999, to 42.8% of GDP in 2004. 
Government revenue fell from 40.4% of GDP in 1999 to 38.8% of GDP in 2004. Thus, in the 
first five years since Greece was deemed to have marginally satisfied the Maastricht fiscal 
criteria, a significant further fiscal relaxation had occurred, both through the expenditure and 
the revenue side. General government debt rose from 98.9% of GDP in 1999 to 102.9% of 
                                                     
26 Constantine Simitis succeeded Andreas Papandreou as Prime Minister, after the latter’s prolonged illness, in 
early 1996. He called and won early parliamentary elections in September 1996 and remained in office until 
March 2004. 
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GDP in 2004. This fiscal relaxation occurred during a period of high growth, and cannot be 
justified on the grounds of a countercyclical fiscal policy.27 
Following the election of a new ND government under Costas Karamanlis in March 2004, and 
the conclusion of the Olympic Games in the same year, a two year stabilization program partly 
reversed these trends. The primary deficit of the general government was reduced from 4% 
of GDP in 2004 to 1.5% in both 2005 and 2006. The general government deficit was reduced 
from 8.8% of GDP in 2004 to 5.9% of GDP in 2006. The adjustment was gradual and limited 
due to concerns that a larger fiscal adjustment might induce a deep recession.28 
A deep recession was eventually caused by the international financial crisis of 2007-09. 
Combined with the domestic electoral and political cycle the recession resulted in a significant 
further deterioration of the fiscal balance. The combination of a pause in the fiscal adjustment 
and the operation of ‘automatic fiscal’ stabilizers during the deep international recession of 
2008-09 caused the 2009 general government deficit to eventually rise to 15.1% of GDP.29 
This made international headlines, as, following the elections of 2009, the newly elected 
government of George Papandreou accused the previous government of Costas Karamanlis 
of consciously under-predicting the extent of the 2009 fiscal deficit. While continuing a policy 
of fiscal expansion for the remainder of 2009, instead of immediately initiating a fiscal 
adjustment program, the incoming government then proceeded to a retroactive revision of 
the fiscal accounts for the previous three years. 
The announcements concerning the fiscal deficit, the retroactive revisions of the fiscal 
accounts and the reluctance of the Papandreou government to tackle the deficit in its first 
budget, resulted in an almost total loss of credibility for Greece in the already jittery 
international financial markets. All these factors paved the way for the ‘sudden stop’ in 
international lending in April 2010. 
 
 
                                                     
27 A large part of these adverse fiscal developments was only revealed in 2004, after Eurostat, the statistical arm 
of the EU Commission, with the cooperation of the new Greek government of Costas Karamanlis, significantly 
revised the fiscal accounts of Greece for the period 2000-2004. This ‘fiscal audit’ revealed significant deficiencies 
in Greece’s fiscal accounts, especially the accounts of public organisations such as hospitals, social security funds, 
local authorities and the accounts for military procurement. An EU supervised program to correct these 
deficiencies, and a tightening of Eurostat’s statistical rules, were only partly successful, as problems with 
Greece’s fiscal accounts reemerged during the international financial crisis, towards the end of the decade. 
These problems, which have existed in various forms since the 1980s, have contributed to a general mistrust of 
Greek statistics. 
28 This is another key indication that after euro area entry Greek governments were constrained by the 
Mundellian dilemma. 
29 Costas Karamanlis had called and won an early parliamentary election in September 2007, citing the need for 
a mandate for further fiscal adjustment. However, his parliamentary majority was thin, while the opposition 
threatened to overturn the government in early 2010, at the end of the term of the President of the Republic. 
Election of a new President required a parliamentary majority of three fifths, which the government could not 
command. If parliament failed to vote for a new President of the Republic, it would have been dissolved in the 
middle of its four year term and new elections called. This, and the onset of the financial crisis, caused the second 
Karamanlis government of 2007 to postpone its plans for further fiscal adjustment and eventually call early 
elections itself in October 2009, in anticipation of the certain dissolution of parliament in March 2010.  
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5.4 The Sudden Stop and the “Austerity Program” 
The ‘sudden stop’ in international lending, in the early part of 2010, was followed by an 
internationally imposed macroeconomic adjustment program, as one of the preconditions for 
the bailout of Greece. A ‘troika’, consisting of representatives of the EU Commission, the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), designed and 
administered this economic adjustment program. Its three main elements was a front loaded 
fiscal adjustment, nominal wage reductions (‘internal devaluation’) and a list of structural 
reforms in order to improve aggregate productivity and competitiveness. The first two 
elements were supposed to quickly correct fiscal imbalances and problems of international 
competitiveness, while the third element was supposed to increase Greek productivity and 
international competitiveness in the medium term. 
The multiyear economic adjustment program, although draconian on paper, proved much 
less effective than envisaged by its designers. In the first two years, between 2010 and 2011, 
the general government deficit was reduced to 10.3% of GDP, and the primary deficit to 3.0% 
of GDP. These were the levels that characterized 2008, the year before the ‘annus horribilis' 
2009. In addition, because the recession and deflation turned out to be much deeper than 
anticipated in the program, the general government debt to GDP ratio rose from 126.7% of 
GDP in 2009 to 172.1% of GDP in 2011. By the end of 2011, real GDP per capita had fallen by 
almost 18.5% since its peak in 2007, while the unemployment rate had risen to 21.2%, 
compared to 8.4% at the end of 2008.  
The fiscal adjustment program was clearly not working. The troika revised it in the direction 
of even more fiscal austerity and a significant haircut to Greece’s sovereign debt was 
engineered, through the, so-called, Private Sector Involvement (PSI). Yet, progress on the 
fiscal front was slow and the recession intensified. 
Between 2010 and 2014, successive rounds of fiscal austerity were implemented by three 
successive governments, under the umbrella of two successive economic adjustment 
programs, summarized in respective ‘memoranda’ between Greece and the “troika”. The 
2014 fiscal deficit was reduced to 3.6% of GDP and the primary deficit was transformed to a 
small surplus of 0.3% of GDP. Yet the government debt to GDP ratio had risen to 178.9% of 
GDP, unemployment to 25.9% and, since the end of 2007, Greece had suffered a cumulated 
loss of real output per head equal to 25%.30 
The real economic and social cost of the first two economic adjustment programs was clearly 
too high given its effects on the deficit and debt of the general government. 
Early elections took place in January 2015, which resulted in the new SYRIZA led government 
of Alexis Tsipras. A new round of austerity was agreed with the new government in mid-2015, 
                                                     
30 The recession caused by fiscal adjustment was much deeper than anticipated by the ‘troika’ in their successive 
plans. The IMF, in its October 2012 World Economic Outlook, on the basis of research later published in 
Blanchard and Leigh (2013, 2014), attributed this to the underestimation of the fiscal multipliers, i.e., the 
percentage change in output caused by a given change in government expenditure and taxes as a percentage of 
GDP. “Actual fiscal multipliers were larger than forecasters assumed” (IMF (2012), p. 43). Alesina et al (2019), p. 
157, dispute this interpretation for the case of Greece, and attribute the depth of the recession to the sheer 
magnitude of the fiscal adjustment that was required. They argue that “the failure of the Greek plans was not 
due to the technical problem of underestimation of multipliers, but to a much deeper political and economic 
failure of the Troika and the Greek authorities to handle the crisis, as well as to the size of the plans.” 
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after the new government had unsuccessfully tried to resist implementing austerity for six 
months, at great cost for the already weakened Greek economy. This third economic 
adjustment program was detailed in the third ‘memorandum’ between Greece and the 
‘troika’.31 
Fiscal adjustment continued into 2018. By the end of 2017, the general government balance 
had moved into a small surplus of 0.7% of GDP and the primary surplus had risen to 3.9% of 
GDP. The government debt to GDP ratio had fallen slightly, to 176.1% of GDP, while GDP 
growth turned slightly positive in 2017. The economic adjustment program was officially 
terminated in August 2018, although Greece remains under a regime of enhanced 
surveillance by the euro area institutions.  
 
6. Monetary Policy Cycles, Inflation and International 
Competitiveness 
The four fiscal cycles of expansion and contraction, highlighted in the previous section, were 
accompanied by corresponding cycles in monetary and incomes policy, inflation and 
international competitiveness. Again the drivers of these cycles were political and economic 
developments which first led to destabilization and then to adjustment.  
 
6.1 The Inflationary Incomes, Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy of the 1980s 
In addition to the fiscal destabilization, a second reason for the deterioration of the 
performance of the Greek economy after 1981 was the combination of the incomes, 
monetary and exchange rate policies adopted by the governments of Andreas Papandreou in 
the 1980s. Following the second international oil shock, these policies led to a vicious wage 
and price spiral, which initially led to a significant loss of international competitiveness and 
subsequently contributed to the persistence of high inflation. Two brief stabilization attempts 
in 1983 and 1985 proved to be too little too late and were soon abandoned for electoral 
reasons. 
In 1982, the newly elected Papandreou government legislated an increase in the minimum 
wage by about 45%, in addition to a pre-election increase of 23%, initiated by the outgoing 
government of George Rallis during 1981. Minimum wages rose by 47%, in addition to an 
increase of 25% in 1981. It should be noted that inflation, due to the second oil shock and the 
relatively accommodating monetary and exchange rate policy, had already reached 24.5% in 
1981. Yet, the nominal wage rises in 1982 were much higher than the rate of inflation. In 
addition, a system of automatic indexation of wages was introduced, called ATA, from its 
Greek initials. ATA resulted in automatic increases in wages and salaries every four months 
and contributed to the rigidity of real wages.32 
                                                     
31 The term ‘troika’ was replaced by the term ‘institutions’ in this third memorandum of 2015. 
32 It is well known that wage indexation leads to the rigidity of real wages rather than nominal wages. See Gray 
(1976). 
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This incomes policy temporarily raised real wages but, as labor productivity was declining, it 
also led to significant losses of competitiveness. In 1982, average nominal earnings increased 
by 27.5%, and real earnings by 5.3%. Between 1980 and 1982, Greece’s real effective 
exchange rate against the EU-15, based on relative unit labor costs, appreciated by almost 
28%.  
This unwarranted real wage increase and real exchange rate appreciation led to rise in 
unemployment, a delay in the recovery of the Greek economy from the second oil shock, the 
persistence of high inflation and a rise in the current account deficit, despite the decline in 
investment and growth rates. These effects were reinforced by tax increases on business 
profits, which took effect at the same time. It was probably the main reason why Greece had 
to resort to two consecutive stabilization programs and devaluations of the drachma in 1983 
and 1985. 
Because of these adverse side-effects, the incomes policy of the early 1980s brought about 
its own reversal. In the years that followed incomes policy had a negative impact on increases 
in real earnings, reversing the gains of the early 1980s. While in the decade 1970-1979 real 
earnings increased on average by 5.0% per annum, in the 1980-1989 period their average 
annual growth rate fell to 0.2%. Neither large increases in nominal wages nor automatic wage 
indexation led to corresponding increases in real wages, as a restrictive incomes policy had to 
be adopted in the 1986-87 period, because of the negative developments to labor 
productivity, the loss of competitiveness and a current account crisis. 
The wage price spiral of the first half of the 1980s, which is depicted in figure 11, was also 
sustained as a result of the expansionary monetary and exchange rate policy that 
accompanied it. Monetary and exchange rate policy contributed to the persistence of high 
inflation throughout the 1980s. As can be seen from figure 11, average annual wage and price 
inflation exceeded 21% in the first half of the 1980s, and decelerated slightly in the second 
half, following the 1985 devaluation and the restrictive incomes policy of the 1986-87 
period.33 
Note that, due to the fact that Greek inflation was almost double the inflation rate of the 
OECD economies, the real exchange rate (based on unit labor costs) was appreciating by an 
average of 3.0% per year. This was despite the continuous depreciations of the drachma 
implied by the crawling peg rule. The crawling peg policy rule was first adopted after 1975 
and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. In the absence of free 
capital mobility, the exchange rate was determined on a daily basis by the Bank of Greece, 
with a view of adjusting the nominal effective exchange rate in order to partly counter the 
inflation differences between Greece and its partners in the OECD. Discrete devaluations 
were also used occasionally, such as the ones in 1983 and 1985. The implications of this 
exchange rate policy for the nominal effective exchange rate are depicted in Figure 12. As can 
be easily deduced, the policy became ever more accommodative in the first half of the 1980s 
and the second devaluation of 1985.34 
                                                     
33 In figure 11, wage inflation is the annual percentage change of annual earnings per employee, while price 
inflation is the annual percentage change of the Consumer Price Index, 2010=100. Shaded bars indicate years of 
recession. Source: European Commission, Annual Macroeconomic Data Bank, November 2018. 
34 In figure 12, the Greek inflation differential from the OECD is the difference between the annual percentage 
change of the Consumer Price Index in Greece and the OECD countries respectively, 2010=100. The rate of 
depreciation of the exchange rate is the annual percentage change of the effective exchange rate vis-a-vis 24 
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Figure 11: Wage and Price Inflation (% per year): 1961-2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Greek Inflation Differential from the OECD and Depreciation Rate of the Effective 
Exchange Rate, % per year, 1971-2017 
The exchange rate policy of the 1980s contributed to the persistence of inflation through the 
inflationary expectations of wage and price setters. Yet, it was not sufficiently 
                                                     
industrial economies. Source: European Commission, Annual Macroeconomic Data Bank and OECD, Annual 
Statistics, November 2018. 
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accommodative, so as to halt the loss of competitiveness from the higher Greek inflation. 
Thus, while the wage price spiral and inflation were sustained through the crawling peg 
exchange rate policy, the loss of competitiveness was not averted.35 
 
6.2. The Monetary Tightening of the 1990s, Disinflation and Euro area Entry 
Beyond fiscal tightening, the second element of the policy reversal of the 1990s was the 
tightening of monetary and exchange policy. This was in accordance with the requirements 
of the Maastricht Treaty in order to achieve nominal convergence and address the problem 
of high inflation. 
Following the abandonment of the short-lived stabilization program of 1986-1987 by the 
government of Andreas Papandreou, inflationary pressures reappeared in 1988. The Bank of 
Greece and the new government of Constantine Mitsotakis, which took office in April 1990, 
launched a new anti-inflationary strategy. This was based on the gradual reduction of the rate 
of depreciation of the drachma significantly below the discrepancy between Greek and OECD 
inflation. In this way, they sought to gradually reduce inflationary expectations and address 
the vicious wage-price spiral. This policy gradually became tighter and eventually contributed 
to the reduction of inflation. The peak of the annual inflation rate was at 23.9%, in November 
1990. Since then, inflation entered a downwards path. The annual inflation rate on a monthly 
basis is depicted in Figure 13. The rise of the 1970s, the sustained inflation of the 1980s and 
the disinflation of the 1990s can be clearly discerned.36 
The reduction of inflation was driven by a change in both incomes, monetary and exchange 
rate policy. The new policy was dubbed the “hard drachma” policy. The policy gradually 
became more credible due to the fiscal adjustment of the early 1990s, the gradual 
discontinuation of the monetary financing of budget deficits by the Bank of Greece and the 
rise of nominal interest rates following the liberalization of the financial system in the late 
1980s.  
Direct funding of the general government from the central bank gradually stopped between 
1990 and 1993, as envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty. In the period up to 1994, restrictions 
on interest rates on loans and deposits, as well as capital controls, were abolished, in the 
context of financial liberalization. This initially resulted in higher interest rates due to the high 
inflationary expectations and persistent expectations of an unannounced depreciation of the 
drachma. When these expectations eventually adjusted, both nominal and real interest rates 
declined. The political independence of the Bank of Greece was introduced in 1997, as 
required by the Maastricht Treaty. The role of the private sector in the financial system was 
also strengthened in order to increase its effectiveness. Some smaller state-owned banks 
were fully privatized, and new private banks were created. 
                                                     
35 See Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991) and Alogoskoufis (1992) for theoretical and empirical analyses of the link 
between exchange rate regimes and inflation persistence. Alogoskoufis and Philippopoulos (1992), Alogoskoufis 
(1995) and Alogoskoufis et al (1998) provide econometric evidence on how this mechanism worked in the case 
of Greece.  
36 In figure 13, inflation is the annual percentage change of the monthly Consumer Price Index, 2010=100. 
Source: OECD, Monthly Economic Indicators, 2019. 
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Figure 13: The Inflation of the 1980s and the Disinflation of the 1990s % per year, monthly 
data, 1970-2018 
 
However, there were instances in which the decline of inflation was interrupted. The first was 
the 1992-93 period, when inflation temporarily rose as a result of the rise in indirect taxes 
aimed at boosting public revenues and strengthening fiscal adjustment. This was pre-planned 
and temporary. The second period was the second half of 1994, due to the relaxation of 
monetary policy following the elections of October 1993 and the change in government. This 
relaxation led to a currency crisis in the summer of 1994 which prompted a prolonged 
increase in short-term interest rates. The post election monetary loosening was also 
accompanied by high increases in nominal wages. In the end, both monetary and exchange 
rate policy were tightened back and inflation returned to its downward course. Inflation rose 
temporarily in two other instances. First, in the brief 1996 election period, due to large wage 
increases in the public sector with spillover effects for the private sector as well. Second, in 
the period following the temporary devaluation of the drachma in March 1998. 
The devaluation of March 1998 took place after another prolonged crisis of confidence in the 
hard drachma policy, which forced the Bank of Greece to keep short-term interest rates at 
exorbitantly high levels for about 6 months. The devaluation contributed to an easing of the 
pressures and allowed the drachma to be introduced into the exchange rate mechanism 
(ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS). According to the Maastricht Treaty, 
participation in the ERM for two years was one of the criteria for acceptance into the euro 
area.37 
The fall in inflation generated a corresponding fall in both short term and long term interest 
rates as well as a frantic rise in stock prices. Both were based on the growing realization, 
towards the end of the 1990s, that Greece would eventually participate in EMU and thus 
tackle inflation once and for all. This created growing and self-fulfilling expectations of a 
virtuous disinflationary cycle. 
                                                     
37 See Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989) and Eichengreen (2008) for detailed analyses of operation of the European 
Monetary System. 
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Greece was finally accepted for membership of the euro area in June 2000, two years after 
the selection of the initial 11 countries and the creation of the euro in non-physical form, but 
before the creation of the euro in physical form, which took place in January 2001. 
Once in the euro area, Greece lost its monetary autonomy and its monetary policy was 
decided in Frankfurt, the headquarters of the European Central Bank (ECB). Inflation 
remained low and Greek long term interest rates converged rapidly to the interest rates of 
the other member states as devaluation expectations also disappeared. 
 
 6.3 The Euro, Monetary and Financial Euphoria and External Debt 
Accumulation 
The liberalization of the financial system played an important role in macroeconomic 
developments in the first decade after Greece joined the euro area. However, it also 
contributed decisively to the persistent widening of the current account deficit, which 
emerged as the main underlying cause of the 2010 crisis. 
Following the reduction of real interest rates, private sector savings fell and private 
investment rose. This contributed to a significant widening of the current account deficit. 
Bank credit also exploded, in order to finance the gap between the reduced savings and 
increased investment of the private sector. 
The evolution of real interest rates and total bank credit relative to GDP is depicted in figures 
14 and 15.38 
As can be seen from figure 14, real lending rates fell from 13.4% in 1997 to 2.7% in 2002. They 
fell by more than ten (10) percentage points, to almost a fifth of their 1997 level. Real deposit 
rates fell from 4.6% in 1997 to -2,0% in 2002. They fell by almost seven (7) percentage points 
and became significantly negative. As a result, aggregate investment boomed and private 
sector savings collapsed. 
As can be seen from Figure 15, total bank credit grew from 81.5% of GDP in 1999 to 131.3% 
of GDP in 2009. For about ten years it was growing 1.6 times faster than GDP. Total bank 
credit to the private sector increased at a rate 3 times higher than nominal GDP. It exploded 
from 34.2% of GDP in 1999 to 105.1% of GDP in 2009. At the same time, bank credit to the 
general government, i.e., government bonds held by banks and other loans to the general 
government, fell from 47.2% of GDP in 1999 to 26.2% of GDP in 2009.39 
The fall in real interest rates, coupled with the liberalization of the domestic financial system, 
led to a real boom in private sector borrowing. Household loans for house purchases rose 
fivefold as a percentage of GDP, from 6% in 1999 to 33.1% in 2009. Consumer loans to 
households also rose fivefold relative to GDP, from 2.8% in 1999 to 15.3% in 2009. Total loans 
to households rose from 8.8% of GDP in 1999 to 49.7% of GDP in 2009. Total loans to 
                                                     
38 The data in figures 14 and 15 are from European Commission, Annual Macroeconomic Data Bank, November 
2018 and the Bank of Greece. 
39 See Halliassos et al (2017) and Louri (2019) for surveys of financial developments and the crisis. 
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Figure 14: The Evolution of Real Interest Rates, % per year: 1992-2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
enterprises more than doubled in relation to GDP, from 25.4% in 1999 to 55.4% in 2009. 
It is obvious from the evolution of bank credit that Greek financial institutions were using the 
Greek government bonds in their portfolios as collateral, in order to obtain liquidity from 
foreign financial institutions, and thus extend additional credit to the domestic private sector. 
This helped to sustain the rise in the current account deficit, as it facilitated and financed the 
excess of private sector investment over savings. It also resulted in the internationalization of 
Greek government debt, making Greece particularly vulnerable when the international 
financial crisis deteriorated in 2008. 
These developments suggest that the significant and prolonged widening of the current 
account deficit after Greece’s accession to the euro area can be explained by two factors. 
Firstly, the imbalance between private savings and investment caused by the steep reduction 
in real interest rates, and the financial boom brought about after accession to the euro area. 
Secondly, by the widening of the general government deficit, due to the fiscal relaxation that 
followed accession to the euro area. Both imbalances persisted until the financial crisis of 
2008, despite the fiscal adjustment program of 2005-2006. 
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Figure 15: The Evolution of Total Bank Credit, % of GDP: 1992-2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.4 The Role of International Competitiveness 
An important factor that made it difficult to address the persistent increase of Greece's 
current account deficit was the inability to resort to a one-off devaluation of the exchange 
rate. Greece had entered the euro area at a grossly overvalued real exchange rate. 
Due to the large wage increases in the five-year period 1981-1985, the real exchange rate had 
appreciated by about 16% over the previous five-year period 1976-1980. Following the 
devaluation of 1985, in response to a current account crisis, the real exchange rate 
depreciated by about 19% over the two-year period 1986-1987 compared to 1984-1985. After 
1988, a new round of real appreciations followed, due to the return of real wage increases, 
Greece’s higher inflation rate and, after 1990, the hard drachma policy. 
The evolution of Greece’s real effective exchange rate vis-a-vis the EU-15 is depicted in figure 
16. Between 1987 and 1997, the real exchange rate vis-a-vis the EU-15, on the basis of relative 
unit labor costs, appreciated by around 31%.40 
In order for the drachma to be admitted to the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS in 1998, 
there was a one-off devaluation. However, this was subsequently followed by an appreciation 
of the drachma. A further small devaluation occurred when the conversion rate of the 
drachma into euros was determined. Thus, in 2001 there was a real depreciation of about 3%, 
relative to 1997, on the basis of the relative unit labor costs against the EU-15. However, the 
real exchange rate remained significantly overvalued compared to 1987. The real 
appreciation compared to 1987 was equal to 26.6%.  
 
                                                     
40 The data source for figure 16 is European Commission, Annual Macroeconomic Data Bank, November 2018 
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Figure 16: The Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER), Based on Unit Labor Costs, 2010=100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, immediately after joining the euro area, wage increases led to inflation rates which 
were higher than the inflation rate of the other euro area countries, without any possibility 
of a further devaluation. Between 2001 and 2009 the real exchange rate had appreciated by 
a further 26.4%. Thus, at the end of 2009, the real exchange rate vis-a-vis the EU-15, had 
appreciated by almost 60% compared to 1987.  
There is little doubt that the continuous real appreciation of the exchange rate contributed 
to the sustained savings-investment imbalance and caused the current account deficit to keep 
rising. After Greece joined the euro area, the inability to resort to a devaluation of the 
exchange rate meant that it was no longer possible to correct the deficit without a major 
recession and a significant reduction in nominal wages. Greece was caught in a Mundellian 
trap. 
The macroeconomic euphoria of the period up to 2007 gradually gave way to anxiety during 
2008, as the US sub-prime crisis spread internationally and resulted in an international 
recession. The crunch came in September 2008, with the collapse of Lehman Brothers that 
marked the worst manifestation of the international financial crisis to that point. 
 
 6.5 The Sudden Stop, the Credit Crunch and the Deflationary Spiral 
The first manifestation of the effects of the international financial crisis in Greece was a loss 
of deposits by some of the weaker banks and the rise in interest rate spreads following the 
Lehman collapse. 
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It is worth focusing on the evolution of the yield of 10 year government bonds, depicted in 
figure 17, as long term interest rates are very sensitive to expectations about future inflation, 
devaluation and default.  
One of the most positive developments for Greece before the crisis, was the rapid 
convergence of interest rates with those of other EU economies, and in particular Germany. 
At the end of 1992, the spread between the yield of Greek and German 10 year bonds was 
equal to 17.2%, or 1720 basis points, reflecting the much higher inflation in Greece and 
expectations of a future devaluation of the drachma. By the time of Greece’s accession to the 
euro area in January 2001, the spread had fallen to 0.55%, or 55 basis points. Greek yields had 
fallen to almost the same level as Germany’s. The reduction of inflationary expectations and 
the disappearance of the risk of an unanticipated devaluation caused Greek interest rates to 
converge with German ones. 
Figure 17: Annual Percentage Yield of 10 Year Government Bonds, Monthly Data  
Greece vs Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From January 2001 till December 2007 the interest rate spread fluctuated around an average 
of 0.30%, or 30 basis points. Spreads started rising slightly in the first half of 2008, but it was 
only after the collapse of Lehman Brothers that the process gained momentum. By December 
2008 the average spread rose to 2.03% or 203 basis points. This was the first indication that 
bond markets were reassessing the risks associated with Greek bonds. Spreads continued 
rising in the first few months of 2009, but then the process was reversed, as Greece 
successfully completed its bond refinancing program for 2009. By September 2009, and in 
view of a forthcoming general election, held in the beginning of October, spreads had fallen 
back to 1.30%, or 130 basis points. 
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After the election and the first policy pronouncements of the new government of George 
Papandreou spreads started rising again. By December 2009, after the budget voted in by the 
new government quashed expectations of significant fiscal tightening, they had almost 
doubled to 2.35%. The rise continued in the first few months of 2010. As can be deduced from 
figure 17, in March 2010 they had reached 3.14% and after the announcement of the Greek 
bailout in April the rise accelerated. By September 2010 they had almost tripled to 9.04%, or 
904 basis points. 
The rise in the spread of government bonds filtered through the rest of the financial system. 
Both lending and deposit rates started rising after 2010. Credit expansion decelerated and 
eventually turned into credit contraction and a credit crunch, as Greek banks started bleeding 
deposits, due to a massive capital flight. What this outcome inevitable? Not necessarily. 
Capital controls would have averted this capital flight and the credit crunch, but they were 
not even discussed by the troika at the time.41  
Following the failure of the first economic adjustment program to meet its targets, and the 
rising expectations about Grexit, a second economic adjustment program was agreed in July 
2011. Yet, the capital flight intensified, as the second program also provided for a partial 
write-down of Greek debt through the Private Sector Involvement (PSI). This provision, and 
the eventual write-down, brought about a credit crunch which deepened and prolonged the 
recession. As can be seen from figure 17, the spread of Greek 10 year government bonds 
started rising again in the second half of 2011, peaked at 27.4% in February 2012 and 
remained around 20% until the Draghi “whatever it takes” intervention of July 2012.  
The haircut on Greek debt finally ‘agreed’ with the banks in the context of the PSI was higher 
than originally expected, further worsening the credit crunch and creating the need for a 
recapitalization of Greek banks. As can be seen from Figure 15, between 2011 and 2014, total 
outstanding credit declined by 26%, or from 160% of GDP to 137% of GDP. 
The credit crunch worsened in the first six months of 2015, following the election of the 
Tsipras government and the almost catastrophic attempt to renegotiate the terms of Greece’s 
bailout. Spreads rose again and the capital flight re-emerged. However, after the imposition 
of capital controls and agreement on the third bailout, credit conditions gradually improved, 
although the contraction of credit continued into 2017, albeit at a slower pace.  
 
 
                                                     
41 See Rodrik (2011), Chapter 5 on the IMF’s insistence on free capital mobility, even for less developed 
economies and economies in crisis. He argues (p. 90) that, “Since the late 1980s, the IMF had become a strong 
supporter of freeing up capital markets. The advice that it gave to countries that came under its influence 
increasingly reflected that preference.” Despite the excesses of financial markets, and sovereign debt crises that 
were the result of cycles of excessive international lending and sudden stops (such as the Latin American crisis 
of the 1980s, the Asian crisis of the 1990s and the euro area crisis of the 2010s) Greece’s official creditors did 
not contemplate allowing for capital controls in the early stages of the crisis. They only reluctantly agreed to 
capital controls in June 2015, when the third round of post-crisis capital flight looked like inducing an unruly 
Grexit. Yet, capital controls should have been used from the start of the crisis, in early 2010. This would have 
sheltered Greece as it would have averted the collapse of Greece’s financial system and the worst aspects of the 
credit crunch.  
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7. The Crisis and the Fault Lines of the Euro Area 
Our focus so far has been on the problems of the Greek economy. Yet the problems of the 
Greek economy were not too dissimilar to, although clearly worse than, the problems faced 
by other economies in the euro area periphery. In addition, the economic adjustment 
program of Greece was constrained by what was going on in the rest of the euro area. The 
Greek crisis was thus not due only to the weaknesses of the Greek economy and its 
macroeconomic policy, but also to fault lines in the euro area itself. It is the purpose of this 
section to briefly examine these euro area wide issues, and in particular the asymmetries 
between the core and the periphery.42 
 
7.1 The Euro Area as an Optimum Currency Area 
The launch of the euro in 1999 and the admission of economies of the periphery like Greece's 
was politically motivated and never met the acid-tests suggested by the literature on 
optimum currency areas. Nevertheless, such considerations can prove extremely useful in 
thinking about the main fault lines of the euro area itself and the prospects of countries of 
the periphery, such as Greece's, within the area. 
What are these considerations? The optimum currency area literature poses a seemingly 
simple question: If we forget about national boundaries and focus purely on economic 
relations, which is the best constellation of countries that can share a single currency? In 
answering this question, it considers the benefits and costs from giving up national currencies 
and national monetary policies and substituting them by a single currency and a single 
monetary policy.43  
The literature stresses four potential benefits from the adoption of a single currency. First, 
the reduction of cross border transaction costs, from the elimination of the need to exchange 
different currencies. Second, the increase in transparency, that makes prices in different 
countries easily comparable. Third, the elimination of currency risk, associated with changes 
in exchange rates. Finally, the switch to a low inflation monetary policy for countries with 
inflationary monetary policies.44 
The potential costs from the adoption of a single currency is the cost of the loss of the ability 
of each country to use monetary and exchange rate policy to tackle the undesirable 
macroeconomic consequences of shocks that impact the various economies asymmetrically, 
and, potentially and the loss of the ability of each country to use its monetary policy in 
                                                     
42 This section of the paper is largely adapted from Alogoskoufis and Jacque (2019). 
43 This question was first posed, and partially answered, by Mundell (1961) who is rightly considered as the 
originator of this literature. McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) were early major contributors. The literature 
was revived in the 1980s, as as additional considerations, such as inflation differentials, were added. A survey of 
the so called ‘new’ theory of optimum currency areas can be found in Tavlas (1993). 
44 This last argument presupposes that the central bank administering the single currency is politically 
independent and cares mostly about inflation. This clearly applies to the euro area. 
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choosing the appropriate inflation tax and the optimal combination of inflation and 
unemployment according to its own preferences.45  
A high potential trading volume among the participating countries would result in higher 
marginal benefits from the reduction of transaction costs and exchange rate uncertainty. This 
was an argument put forward by both Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963), who gave 
emphasis to the degree of economic integration and openness. Hence, countries that are 
more economically open, geographically close and economically integrated, will have 
significant trading volumes among themselves and, therefore, higher marginal benefits from 
sharing a common currency.46  
The inflation criterion, also emphasized first by McKinnon (1963) and later by Mundell (1973), 
is more questionable. Whereas it may be a benefit of a high inflation country, such as Greece 
in the 1980s, to participate in a low inflation monetary union and borrow its anti-inflationary 
credibility, it may be a cost for the other participating countries to accept a high inflation 
economy in a monetary union.47  
With regard to marginal costs, the original considerations proposed by Mundell (1961) 
emphasized the degree of cross border factor and, especially, labor mobility. If cross border 
labor mobility is high, then a country hit asymmetrically by an adverse employment shock will 
not suffer from persistent unemployment, because the unemployed will migrate to high 
employment countries in the monetary union. Hence, increased labor mobility can reduce the 
marginal costs of joining a monetary union from the loss of the domestic monetary policy 
instruments, such as interest rates and the exchange rate.48  
Kenen (1969) gave emphasis to the degree of product diversification. His argument was that 
countries with a relatively diversified product mix were less likely to suffer from the impact 
of industry specific shocks. Hence, an increased diversification of the average product mix of 
participating countries will tend to shift the marginal costs of joining a monetary union 
downwards. 
Another important criterion which was first emphasized by Kenen (1969) is the existence of a 
significant federal budget, that results in automatic transfers towards countries that are hit 
by an adverse asymmetric shock, from countries that have not been hit by the shock. The 
higher the fiscal transfers from a high federal budget, the lower the costs of joining a 
monetary union in the presence of asymmetric shocks. The fact that the EU federal budget is 
extremely low, around 1% of EU GDP, is a factor that keeps marginal costs at a higher level, 
                                                     
45 Given that most macroeconomists accept the Friedman (1968) natural rate hypothesis, that there is no long-
run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment, this latter argument does not enjoy much support. 
46 This is a criterion that is obviously satisfied by the EU countries, which are all geographically located in Europe, 
have eliminated trade barriers and created a single market and have high trading volumes among themselves. 
47 This may be one of the reasons why the Maastricht treaty envisaged convergence of inflation rates and 
nominal interest rates as a prerequisite for acceptance in the euro area. The inflation tax argument is also a 
justification for the fiscal criteria, of budget deficits lower than 3% of GDP and government debts tending to 60% 
of GDP of an applicant. 
48 This also applied in principle to the EU, as the free movement of people is one of the four fundamental 
freedoms of the Treaties, along with the free movement of goods, services and capital. In practice however, 
because of both cultural, administrative and tax-benefit considerations, labour markets in the European Union 
remain segmented. 
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suggesting that due to the small size of the EU federal budget, the optimal euro area is 
probably on the low rather than the high side.49 
Finally other criteria that affect marginal benefits and costs include the homogeneity of 
national preferences and existence or not of political solidarity among member states in a 
monetary union. 
One cannot, and in any case would not want to use these optimum currency area 
considerations to determine in an absolute fashion whether the current euro area is an 
optimum currency area or not. In all probability no single currency area is an optimum 
currency area, including the United States. 
However, as O’ Rourke and Taylor (2013), among others, have recently argued, the United 
States is much closer to the optimum currency area criteria than the euro area.  
First and foremost, US markets are much more closely integrated that EA markets, as cross 
border inter-state trade amounts to 66% of US GDP, whereas cross border inter-country trade 
amounts to only 17% of EA GDP. 
Second, with regard to the asymmetric impact of shocks, there do not seem to major 
differences between the US and the EA. The average correlation coefficient of GDP growth 
rates across US states in 0.46 and across EA countries it is 0.50. Macroeconomic asymmetries 
seem to impact the EA and the US in roughly the same degree. 
However, the US is far ahead of the EA with regard to the labor mobility criterion. The average 
share of people in a US state born outside that state is 42%, while the equivalent share in a 
EA country is only 14%. On the basis of this criterion, labor mobility is three times larger in 
the USA than in the EA. 
In addition, the US is far ahead on the fiscal federalism criterion, which is related to fiscal 
transfers and the effectiveness of automatic stabilizers in the presence of shocks that affect 
states and countries asymmetrically. In the US about 30% of a state income shock is offset 
through federal fiscal transfers. In the EA, the relevant percentage is only 0.5%. Thus, the low 
level of the EA federal budget relative to the US has major implications for the ability of the 
EA to address shocks with an asymmetric impact through transfers from countries not 
affected by the relevant shock. 
Given that macroeconomic and financial asymmetries seem to have increased following the 
creation of the euro, as we shall show below, these considerations suggest the direction of 
the reforms that would take the euro area closer to an optimum currency area. 
 
                                                     
49 This so-called fiscal federalism criterion was investigated by Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991), who pointed to 
the large automatic transfers across US states, due to the large US federal budget of more than 20% of GDP, and 
the federal tax benefit system. In effect a federal budget acts as an automatic stabilizer in the presence of shocks 
that have asymmetric effects, mitigating their impact. A small federal budget, of the order of 1% of GDP, such 
as the EU budget, is clearly an ineffective automatic stabilizer. Darby and Melitz (2008) have documented the 
positive impact of automatic stabilizers in the OECD economies, while Bargain et al (2013) demonstrate that a 
bigger EU federal budget would have mitigated the adverse effects of the euro area crisis for the economies of 
the periphery, by absorbing about 10-15% of the shock.  
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7.2 The Euro Area Crisis: Core vs Periphery and the Policy Response 
One of the main characteristics of the first ten years of the euro area was the development 
of significant external imbalances between the ‘core’ economies of central and northern 
Europe (Germany and smaller economies like the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Finland) 
and the economies of the ‘periphery’ (Spain, Ireland, Greece and Portugal). France and Italy 
were in between, with France displaying more similarities with the ‘core’ and Italy more 
similarities with the ‘periphery’. 
These external imbalances, resulted in the fast and excessive rise in international 
indebtedness of the private and public sector of the countries in the periphery of the euro 
area, much like as in the case of Greece. 
The proximate cause of the external imbalances was the precipitous fall in nominal and real 
interest rates in the periphery, starting in 1995, as these interest rates converged with those 
of the core countries. Thus, Greece was not the only country that experienced significant 
external imbalances after euro area entry. 
For a long time the risks of low interest rates and the consequent widening of external 
imbalances were underestimated. Many even considered the fall in interest rates as highly 
beneficial and an indication of a successful financial integration.50 
A significant problem was that much of the additional investment in the periphery was 
directed to non-tradable sectors, such as public investment and real estate, including housing. 
Hence, the increase in external debt did not lead to an increase of the export capabilities of 
the economies of the European periphery. 
Worse still, capital flows contributed to house price bubbles that eventually would inevitably 
burst, leading to losses for lenders, chiefly banks, who had extended the loans. Due to the 
doom-loop between national banks and national governments, which made national 
governments eventually responsible for bailing out banks, the bursting of these house price 
bubbles eventually led to a rise in government deficits and debts even in countries such as in 
Ireland and Spain, which did not have the significant fiscal imbalances of Greece and, to a 
lesser extent, Portugal. 
The inflows also contributed to the increase of wages and costs, which resulted in losses of 
competitiveness that further contributed to the deficits in the current account. All the 
economies of the periphery - Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain - had inflation rates above 
the euro area average. Instead, all of the core states, except the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg, had inflation rates below the average of the euro area, and particularly 
Germany. 
Hence, the economies of the periphery were not investing sufficiently in sectors which would 
help service their growing external debt, and, in addition, they were continuously losing 
international competitiveness, which undermined even their existing export capacity. 
In addition, the influx of foreign capital, contributed to the financing of budget deficits, which, 
especially in Greece and Portugal, rose after these economies joined the euro area. However, 
                                                     
50 See for example Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) for an early examination of this view. 
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the large accumulated deficits in the current account in Spain were not accompanied by 
higher corresponding public deficits. 
The cumulation of current account imbalances resulted in a corresponding cumulation of 
financial imbalances. These were transmitted to the economies of the core, who were 
financing the current account deficits of the periphery, but also higher investment in the core 
countries. 
The ‘sudden stop’ became a crisis rather than a manageable temporary problem since EA 
members could not devalue and the ECB could not bail out governments, as was the case in 
the US crisis of 2008-09. 
A confidence crisis ensued, first about the countries of the periphery, but later also about 
some of the core countries, regarding their ability to service their public and private external 
debts. This was exacerbated by the unsuccessful efforts to address the debt problem. 
The proximate causes of the crisis – imbalances and lack of crisis management mechanisms –
tell us that there are really three sorts of underlying causes:  
A. Macroeconomic and financial asymmetries and policy failures 
B. Lack of institutions to absorb shocks at the EA level 
C. Crisis mismanagement 
Some of these failures involved unanticipated events. Others were a failure to implement the 
provisions agreed in the Maastricht Treaty. Others, such as the inability of the ECB to act as a 
lender of last resort in the initial phases of the crisis, or the lack of appropriate institutions to 
tackle the asymmetric impact of major shocks are more fundamental and call for major Euro 
area reforms. 
 
7.3 Reforming the Euro Area 
A result of the major asymmetries and other economic and governance problems of the euro 
area is the fact that adjustment efforts since the crisis have shifted the burden exclusively 
towards the weaker economies in the periphery of the euro area, which suffered deep 
recessions, a significant rise in unemployment, continuous tax rises and exorbitant social costs 
for young workers and old age pensioners.   
Although financial market integration and effective regulation of financial markets have taken 
a priority since the 2010 crisis, the euro area remains a single currency area with significant 
real and financial asymmetries, segregated national fiscal systems, weak coordination of fiscal 
policies and a virtually non-existent federal budget. At the same time, the European Central 
Bank (ECB) remains the only major central bank in the industrialized world which cannot 
function properly as a lender of last resort to governments and commercial banks. In addition, 
labor markets in the euro area remain fragmented, contributing to major differences in 
unemployment rates, which are exacerbated by the notoriously low degree of labor mobility 
in Europe. 
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Hence, not only does the euro area not satisfy the main criterion suggested by optimum 
currency area considerations, namely the absence of asymmetries and asymmetric shocks, it 
furthermore lacks the other two main criteria for macroeconomic stabilization, namely 
integrated labor markets and a federal budget that would act as an automatic stabilizer in the 
case of asymmetric macroeconomic developments. Furthermore, its response to major 
financial crises the Euro area is hampered by the lack of an effective lender of last resort, the 
creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) notwithstanding. 
All this suggests the need for further and much more ambitious reforms of the euro area, 
which however lie outside the scope of this paper, which is focused on Greece.51 
 
8. The Way Forward for Greece 
We next turn to the options for Greece following the conclusion of the third bailout and the 
externally imposed adjustment programs in 2018? 
The Mundellian conflict between internal and external balance that has beset Greece, and 
other economies of the EA periphery, since euro area entry is still a major constraint. Greece 
does not have the option to speed up the recovery of its economy through a domestic fiscal 
expansion, as this would result in a widening of the current account deficit, and would in all 
probability conflict with euro area fiscal rules. 
In any case, despite the great recession and the internal devaluation, competitiveness has not 
recovered sufficiently so as to bring about significant current account surpluses. This is unlike 
some of the other economies of the periphery such as Ireland and Spain. Greece is still 
suffering from a weak current account position, and a recovery induced by a domestic fiscal 
expansion would make its external position worse. 
 
8.1 Is Grexit a Solution or a Return to the Problems of the Past? 
Is an orderly exit from the euro area a solution to this Mundellian dilemma for Greece? In my 
view the answer is a resounding no. ‘Grexit’ could prove catastrophic for Greece. 
The first main problem with exiting the euro area is the one associated with the transition. 
Even a well designed transition to a national currency can prove disorderly and extremely 
destabilizing. It is one thing to move from a weak currency to a strong currency, as happened 
in the late 1990s with the creation of the euro area, and another thing to attempt the 
opposite. Expectations of consumers and investors and capital inflows helped facilitate the 
transition in the first case, as everybody wanted a stronger currency. However, in the case of 
a transition to a weaker currency, expectations and capital movements are likely to prove 
extremely destabilizing. Nobody wants to exchange a strong low inflation currency with a 
weak inflationary currency. Hence, the moment that Grexit expectations take hold, capital 
                                                     
51 See Baldwin and Giavazzi (2016), Wyplosz (2016), Benassy-Quere et al. (2018), Pisani-Ferry (2018)  
 and Alogoskoufis and Jacque (2019) for discussions of appropriate EA reforms. 
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flight will in all probability accelerate and bring about a total collapse of the financial system, 
which will of course totally destabilize the transition. 
Even if the transition could be managed relatively effectively, which is doubtful, what would 
happen under a regime of national monetary sovereignty. In all probability, Greece would 
revert to a regime akin to the policies of the 1980s, extensively examined in the previous 
sections, with high inflation and a stagnant economy. Such an outcome would be clearly 
inferior to remaining in the euro area, which at least guarantees low inflation. 
For an economy such as Greece’s, which has in the past abused the degrees of freedom 
afforded to it by monetary sovereignty, trying to escape from the Mundellian trap may mean 
entering into a stagflationary trap, as happened during the 1980s. Thus, ‘Grexit’ may prove to 
be a return to the problems of the past, and especially the first act of the Greek tragedy, that 
of the 1980s, instead of a solution of the current predicament of Greece.  
 
8.2 A New Policy Mix in the Context of the Euro Area 
Remaining in the euro area is the best and, probably, the only realistic option for Greece. 
However, a new policy mix will be required following the conclusion of the economic 
adjustment program, if the weak recovery of the economy since 2017 is to gather strength 
and , more importantly, prove sustainable. 
Such a new policy mix should facilitate the recovery of the economy without simultaneously 
causing a deterioration of Greece’s current account and international competitiveness. The 
recovery should in fact be based on a further improvement in international competitiveness, 
that would help maintain the balance between national savings and domestic investment in 
the medium run, in the face of a recovering economy. This policy mix should therefore focus 
on the improvement of international competitiveness, through a combination of wage 
moderation and a rise in productivity growth, and the rise in aggregate savings, so that the 
increased investment which is a prerequisite for the recovery, can be financed through 
domestic savings and not borrowing from abroad. 
There are four main priorities for such a new policy mix.  
First, a revenue neutral tax reform, that would encourage both savings and investment. More 
emphasis should be placed on taxing consumption and less emphasis on the taxation of 
savings and domestic assets which are the outlet for savings. This should simultaneously boost 
both savings and investment, and hence the recovery, without causing a widening of the 
current account deficit.  
Second, a restoration of the ability of the domestic financial system to finance a recovering 
economy. This should be based on strengthening the balance sheets of Greek banks, through, 
among others, dealing with the problem of non-performing loans (NPLs), so as to facilitate 
the channeling of the increased national savings through the domestic financial system.  
Third, structural reforms that would create opportunities for foreign direct investment in 
sectors producing internationally tradable goods and services. Foreign direct investment is 
not associated with the risks that accompany foreign debt, and can also serve as an 
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instrument through which technical progress and increased productivity can boost an export 
led recovery. 
Finally, a retrenchment of the public sector, through a shift in emphasis from public 
production and procurement of goods and services, to public regulation, even in sectors such 
as health, education and social security. This would help reduce public expenditure, free up 
resources for social protection and increase economic efficiency. Such a retrenchment of the 
public sector is the most effective way in which Greece can meet the fiscal obligations it has 
already undertaken in order to gradually reduce its gigantic public debt. 
For these four priorities to be implemented consistently and credibly, Greece will need to also 
embark on a number of political and institutional reforms. Weak economic and political 
institutions are one of the reasons that nations fail, and there is both historical and statistical 
evidence that such political and institutional weaknesses lie behind many of the economic 
failures of Greece.52 
It is not the purpose of this paper to delve deeper into details of particular reforms, as this 
would be akin to a political program, but it is clear that any new policy initiative for Greece’s 
sustained recovery should respect these four priorities and the underlying institutional 
reforms that would give them credibility.53 
 
9. Conclusions 
This paper has analyzed the process of destabilization, crisis and adjustment in the Greek 
economy, since the accession of the country to the European Union and, subsequently, the 
euro area. It has reviewed the past and discussed alternative ways forward, following the 
‘sudden stop’ and the policies that led to the great depression of the 2010s.  
There have been four distinct 10-year economic policy cycles since Greece’s accession to the 
EU in 1981.  
The first cycle, a cycle of destabilization and stagflation, spanned the 1980s. Many of the 
current problems of the Greek economy, such as its low international competitiveness and 
the high public debt are the legacy of that decade.  
The second cycle, a cycle of incomplete and lopsided adjustment, spanned the 1990s. The 
fiscal and structural adjustment was insufficient and euro area entry was achieved chiefly 
because of the significant tightening of monetary policy. As a result, Greece entered the euro 
area with a low international competitiveness and significant fiscal imbalances. 
                                                     
52 See Acemoglou et al (2005) and Acemoglou and Robinson (2012) for the role of institutions in promoting long-
run growth. A number of recent papers have highlighted the significance of weak institutions for Greece’s 
failures. See, among others, Christodoulakis (2019), Featherstone (2019) and Philippopoulos et al (2019). 
53 Detailed reforms, many of which respect such priorities, are examined in some of the chapters in Meghir et al 
(2017). See in particular, Flevotomou et al (2017) on tax reform, based on a detailed examination of the Greek 
tax and welfare system, Haliassos et al (2017), on the financial sector and its reform, Arkolakis et al (2017) on 
trade adjustment and the introduction by the editors on fiscal reform.  
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The third cycle, a cycle of euro-euphoria, began in the beginning of the new millennium, 
following entry into the euro area. It was marked by a low inflation and interest rate 
environment and an immediate further loosening of fiscal policy. This led to a decade of high 
growth rates and falling unemployment, while inflation remained low. Unfortunately, the 
euphoria depended on external borrowing due to Greece’s low international competitiveness 
at the time of euro area entry. The rapid reduction of real interest rates which followed entry 
caused a widening of the gap between aggregate investment and savings and a sustained 
deterioration of the current account. Successive Greek governments, trapped in a Mundellian 
dilemma between internal and external balance, did not use their only remaining instrument, 
fiscal policy, to address the external imbalances, as this would have triggered a recession and 
killed the “euphoria”. In the end, the accumulation of external debt led to a “sudden stop” in 
international lending to Greece, triggered by the international financial crisis of 2008-09.  
The policy reversal that was imposed on Greece since 2010 has been the fourth policy cycle, 
the `sudden stop’ and the great recession. It was characterized by a front loaded fiscal 
adjustment program, and nominal and real wage cuts, in an environment of financial 
repression. It resulted in the longest and deepest recession of Greece’s post war history. After 
three successive rounds of `austerity’ over eight years the external imbalances were finally 
addressed, but at a huge cost in terms of lost output and jobs.  
Despite the problems of the euro area itself, manifested by the post-2010 crisis and analyzed 
in section 6, exiting the euro area would be a risky and unwise option for Greece. It would in 
all probability bring back all the problems of the past. Thus, it should not even be considered. 
Greece should push for the completion of the necessary reforms that would cause the euro 
area to come closer to being an optimum currency area. 
On the domestic front, the current challenge for Greece, following the completion of the 
externally imposed economic adjustment program, is to design and adopt a policy mix which 
would allow for a modest but sustained recovery within the confines of the evolving euro 
area, without the reappearance of external imbalances. The policy mix should focus on 
further improvements in Greece’s international competitiveness and a rise in domestic 
savings, in order to finance the rise in investment which is necessary for a recovery. I suggest 
that the main elements of such a policy mix must be the following: 
First, a revenue neutral tax reform, that would encourage private savings and investment. The 
current tax system is the result of the strive to increase revenues quickly, and is extremely 
inefficient, especially with regard to incentives for savings and investment. The tax reform 
should concentrate on the simplification of the tax code and the switch from taxes on capital 
to taxes on consumption.  
Second, a restoration of the ability of the financial system to use the increased savings in 
order to finance a recovering economy. The financial system has been decimated in the 
aftermath of the crisis, non-performing loans have soared, and, despite rounds of 
recapitalization, Greek banks are still relatively undercapitalized. It is imperative that the 
problem of NPLs is solved quickly and the banks recapitalized.  
Third, structural reforms that would create opportunities and incentives for foreign direct 
investment in sectors producing internationally tradable goods and services. Foreign direct 
investment is not associated with the risks that accompany foreign debt, and can also serve 
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as an instrument through which technical progress and increased productivity can boost an 
export led recovery.  
Finally, a retrenchment of the public sector through a shift in emphasis from public production 
and procurement of goods and services, to public regulation, even in sectors such as health, 
education and social security. This would help reduce public expenditure, increase economic 
efficiency and induce higher investment, free up resources for social protection and allow 
Greece to effectively reduce its gigantic public debt.54 
For these four priorities to be implemented consistently and credibly, Greece will need to also 
embark on a number of political and institutional reforms. Weak economic and political 
institutions are one of the reasons that nations fail, and there is both historical and statistical 
evidence that political and institutional weaknesses lie behind many of the economic 
problems of Greece's recent past. 
 
                                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
                                                     
54 Many, including the IMF and almost all political parties in Greece, have prioritized a significant write-down of 
Greece’s large official government debt. If such a write-down by official creditors could be agreed upon, it would 
be a welcome addition to the four priorities highlighted above. However, it is no substitute for these priorities. 
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Appendix A:  
Elections, Governing Parties and Prime Ministers in Greece, 1974-
2019 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Election Date    Incoming Government and Prime Minister 
 
1974, November   ND (Constantine Karamanlis) 
1977, November   ND (Constantine Karamanlis)1 
1981, October    PASOK (Andreas Papandreou) 
1985, June    PASOK (Andreas Papandreou) 
1989, June    ND, CLP (Tzannis Tzannetakis) 
1989, November   ND, PASOK, CLP (Xenophon Zolotas)2 
1990, April    ND (Constantine Mitsotakis) 
1993, October    PASOK (Andreas Papandreou)3 
1996, September   PASOK (Costas Simitis) 
2000, March    PASOK (Costas Simitis) 
2004, March    ND (Costas Karamanlis) 
2007, September   ND (Costas Karamanlis) 
2009, October    PASOK (George Papandreou)4 
2012, June    ND, PASOK, DEMAR (Antonis Samaras)5 
2015, January    SYRIZA, ANEL (Alexis Tsipras) 
2015, September   SYRIZA, ANEL (Alexis Tsipras)6 
 
 
Notes on Political Parties: ND (New Democracy, Centre Right party founded by Constantine Karamanlis 
in 1974), PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement, Socialist party founded by Andreas Papandreou in 
1974), CLP (Coalition of the Left and Progress, temporary coalition of the Communist and Euro-
Communist parties of Greece), SYRIZA (Coalition of Radical Left, formed in 2004 by former members 
of the Euro-Communist and Communist parties of Greece), LAOS, (Popular Orthodox Rally, party of 
the Nationalist Right, formed in 2000 by George Karatzaferis, a former ND deputy), DEMAR 
(Democratic Left, formed in 2010 by former members of the Euro-Communist Party of Greece), ANEL 
(Independent Greeks, party of the Nationalist Right, formed in 2012 by Panos Kammenos, a former 
ND deputy).  
 
1 In May 1980 Constantine Karamanlis was elected as President of the Republic. George Rallis was elected 
President of the ND party and was appointed Prime Minister. 
2 Zolotas, a former Governor of the Bank of Greece for many years, was appointed Prime Minister, heading a 
coalition government of National Unity. An inconclusive election had failed to produce a parliamentary majority 
for ND, who had won 46.2% of the vote, but was still 3 deputies short of a parliamentary majority. 
3 After a prolonged illness, Andreas Papandreou resigned as President of PASOK and Prime Minister in January 
2016. Costas Simitis was elected President of PASOK and was then appointed Prime Minister. 
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4 George Papandreou resigned as Prime Minister in November 2011, under pressure from within his own party 
and a number of key EU governments. Lucas Papademos, a former Governor of the Bank of Greece and former 
Vice President of the ECB, was appointed Prime Minister in a coalition government of PASOK, ND and LAOS. 
5 DEMAR left the Samaras government in early 2013. 
6 ANEL left the Tsipras government in February 2019. 
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Appendix B:  
A Brief Chronology of the Greek Crisis, 2010-2018 
 
 
The Run up to the Crisis 
 
2007, February 
International Financial Crisis Erupts. The U.S. subprime mortgage market collapses after the 
housing bubble burst the previous year. The U.S. crisis ultimately triggers a global banking 
crisis and credit crunch that lasts through 2009. 
 
2008, September 15 
Lehman Brothers Collapses. Greek bond yields start rising, but the rise stops in early 2009, as 
Greece completes its annual bond refinancing program. 
 
2009, October 4  
Elections and Change of Government. George Papandreou wins early national elections. 
Within weeks, his government announces that Greece’s budget deficit will exceed 12% of 
GDP, nearly double the original estimates. The figure is later revised upward to 15.4%. 
Spreads start rising again, and Greece’s bonds are downgraded within weeks. 
 
 
The Eight Year Greek Crisis 
 
2010, May 2 
First Greek Bailout. As Greece is eventually shut out of international bond markets, the 
International Monetary Fund and the EU agree to provide Greece with 110 billion euros ($146 
billion) in loans over three years. In exchange, the Greek government signs the memorandum 
for the First Economic Adjustment Program, which commits it to austerity measures, including 
30 billion euros in spending cuts and tax increases, wage cuts and market friendly reforms. 
 
2010, May 10 
ECB Bond Buying and 750 Billion Euro Rescue Package. The European Central Bank (ECB) 
launches its Securities Market Program. The program allows the ECB to purchase government 
bonds of struggling sovereigns in the secondary market, in order to boost market confidence 
and prevent further sovereign debt contagion in the euro area. Finance ministers also agree 
on rescue measures worth 750 billion euros, or nearly $1 trillion, for struggling euro area 
economies, through the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
 
2011, October 31 
A Former Central Banker, Appointed Prime Minister. Papandreou is forced to step down as 
prime minister, after an unsuccessful attempt to call a referendum, and former Central Banker 
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Lucas Papademos is appointed to head a coalition government tasked with implementing 
further austerity measures and structural reforms. 
 
2012, February 21 
EU Agrees to Second Greek Bailout. EU Finance ministers approve a second EU-IMF bailout for 
Greece, worth 130 billion euros ($172 billion). The deal includes a 53.5 percent debt write-
down or “haircut”, for private bondholders. In exchange, Greece must reduce its debt-to-GDP 
ratio from 160 percent to 120.5 percent by 2020. Greece and its private creditors complete 
the debt restructuring on March 9. This is deemed to be the largest such restructuring in 
history. 
 
March 2, 2012. 
EU Adopts Fiscal Compact. In an attempt to strengthen European fiscal coordination, twenty-
five EU member states—all but the UK and the Czech Republic—sign a Fiscal Compact treaty 
mandating stricter budget discipline throughout the union. The agreement includes a 
balanced budget rule requiring governments to keep deficits below 0.5 percent of GDP and 
an undefined “automatic correction mechanism” for countries that miss the target. 
 
May 6, 2012 – June 17, 2012 
Successive Greek Elections and New Coalition Government. New Elections are called for May 
6, 2012. A majority of Greeks vote for fringe parties opposed to the EU-IMF bailout program 
and further austerity, in a rebuke to the two mainstream parties. New elections are called for 
June, in which the center-right (ND) emerges as the winner, with 30 percent of the vote, 
allowing Antonis Samaras, the ND leader, to form a coalition government. Samaras 
immediately signals Greece’s continued commitment to the bailout program, in a U-turn from 
his pre-election pledges. 
 
September 6, 2012 
ECB Unveils Bond-Buying Plan. ECB President Mario Draghi announces an open-ended 
program to buy the government bonds of struggling euro area states on the secondary 
market. The policy shift, coming weeks after Draghi’s vow to “do whatever it takes to preserve 
the euro” is aimed at calming volatile markets, and the ECB’s strong show of commitment 
succeeds in bringing down borrowing costs for indebted periphery countries. 
 
November 27, 2012 
Euro Area Revises Greek Bailout. EA finance ministers and the IMF agree to a revised aid deal 
for Greece, including lower interest rates on Greek bailout loans and a debt-buyback program. 
The new plan allows Greece to cut its debt-to-GDP ratio to 124 percent by 2020, rather than 
120 percent, while committing it to bringing its debt levels “substantially below" 110 percent 
by 2022. 
 
July 17, 2013 
Greek Parliament Approves New Austerity Measures. Greece’s Parliament approves 
unpopular new austerity measures, agreed to as a condition of the ongoing EU-IMF bailout. 
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The legislation include layoffs of some twenty-five thousand public servants, as well as wage 
cuts, tax reform, and other budget cuts. The approval opens the way for a new tranche of 
bailout funds worth nearly 7 billion euros ($9 billion), while labor unions call a general strike 
in protest. 
 
April 10, 2014 
Greece Briefly Returns to International Bond Market. Greece briefly returns to international 
financial markets with its first issue of Eurobonds in four years. The government raises 3 billion 
euros in five year bonds, with an initial yield of under 5 percent—a low rate seen as a mark of 
a return to economic normalcy. In another sign of renewed investor confidence, the offer 
raises 1 billion euros more than expected. 
 
January 22, 2015 
ECB Announces Quantitative Easing Program. Faced with deflation and economic stagnation 
in the EA, the ECB announces a 1.1 trillion euro (more than $1.2 trillion) program of 
quantitative easing (QE) to spur inflation and growth. Under the program, the ECB will 
purchase 60 billion euros in financial assets, including sovereign government bonds, each 
month. However, Greek bonds are not eligible under ECB rules. 
 
January 25, 2015 
Early Elections and New Government. The left-wing, anti-austerity SYRIZA party wins a 
convincing victory in early elections, forced upon the Samaras government, breaking more 
than forty years of two-party rule. Incoming Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras forms a coalition 
government, with ANEL, a party of the Nationalist Right, formed in 2012 by Panos Kammenos, 
a former ND deputy. Tsipras announces a push for a renegotiation of bailout terms, debt 
cancellation, and renewed public sector spending—setting up a six month showdown with 
Greece’s international creditors. 
 
June 30, 2015 
Greek Bailout Expires and Capital Controls Imposed. The Greek government misses its 1.6 
billion euro ($1.7 billion) payment to the IMF when its bailout expires on June 30, making it 
the first developed country to effectively default to the Fund. Negotiations between the 
Greek government and its official creditors fell apart days before, when Prime Minister Tsipras 
proposed a referendum on the EU proposals. To stem capital flight, emergency capital 
controls were imposed, limiting bank withdrawals to 60 euros ($67) per day and calling a bank 
holiday. 
 
July 5, 2016 
Greek Referendum. In a snap referendum, Greeks overwhelmingly rejected the terms of the 
proposed third bailout.  
 
July 16, 2015 
Greek Parliament Supports Terms of a Third Bailout. Prime Minister Tsipras bends to European 
creditors and presses parliament to approve new austerity measures, despite the referendum 
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result. The agreement comes after a weekend of talks in which a Greek exit from the euro 
area (Grexit) was only narrowly averted and opens the way to a third bailout program worth 
up to 86 billion euros ($94 billion). The ECB resumes some support for Greek banks. 
 
August, 2015 
Third Bailout Approved. The Greek parliament adopts a new program of economic reforms as 
part of a new rescue package from the EU, the country’s third since 2010. In exchange for the 
86 billion euro bailout, which is to be distributed through 2018, EU creditors require Greece 
to implement tax reforms, cut public spending, privatize state assets, and reform labor laws, 
among other measures. While the IMF participated in the previous bailouts, the organization 
refuses to contribute additional funds until the creditors provide Greece with “significant debt 
relief.” 
 
September, 2015 
Snap Elections return Tsipras Government. The compromise between the Tsipras government 
and the EU causes splits in the ruling SYRIZA party. Tsipras expels his critics, and calls for early 
elections, which he wins and is returned to power, in a coalition with ANEL. 
 
February, 2017 
Greece’s Creditors Disagree Over Debt Relief. Tensions over Greece’s third bailout grow as the 
IMF warns that the country’s debt is unsustainable and that budget cuts EU creditors demand 
of Greece will hamper its ability to grow. In a compromise, EU representatives agree to more 
lenient budget targets, but they decline to consider any debt relief. Meanwhile, the Tsipras 
government agrees to implement deeper tax and pension reforms, despite domestic pressure 
over a weakening economy and rising poverty. 
 
August 20, 2018 
Greece Exits Final Bailout Program. Greece receives its final loan from European creditors, 
completing a bailout program begun in 2015, the country’s third since 2010. In total, Greece 
now owes the EU and IMF roughly 290 billion euros ($330 billion), part of a public debt that 
has climbed to 180 percent of GDP. To finance this debt, Athens commits to running a budget 
surplus through 2060, accepts continued EU financial supervision, and imposes additional 
austerity measures. EU officials hail the bailout as a success, pointing to Greece’s return to 
growth. Unemployment, too, has fallen, though, at roughly 20 percent, it remains the EU’s 
highest. The IMF, however, maintains that the Greek economy, which has shrunk by 25 
percent since the beginning of the crisis, will likely require further debt relief in the not too 
distant future. 
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